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INTRODUCTION 
With the Internet playing an increasingly dominant role in the 
way people communicate and the World Wide Web becoming a 
major medium by which ideas are exchanged and business con-
ducted, more disputes over intellectual property rights in cyber-
space are making their way towards the courts.  Moreover, in a 
medium in which geographical boundaries are almost meaningless, 
questions of where these disputes can be resolved are often diffi-
cult. 
This Article intends to contribute to the present discussion con-
cerning how to properly address the pertinent legal questions aris-
ing from the utilization of the Internet as a means of communica-
tion.  To understand the Internet’s development allows us to gain a 
better understanding of its particular significance today as well as 
in the near future.  This leads to the insight of how important it is 
to find appropriate answers to the pertinent legal questions deter-
ring copyright holders from posting their works on the Internet.1 
 
1. See the Senate’s Judicial Committee, with regard to the Digital Millennium Act, 
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998), stating that “copyright owners will hesitate to make 
their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will 
be protected against massive piracy”.  After the Senate also Congress on Oct. 13, 1998 
voted for the Digital Millennium Act, Subsequently the President signed the Digital Mil-
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This Article provides an overview of copyright infringement on 
the Internet and the international jurisdictional dilemmas that arise 
in protecting intellectual property rights of Internet content provid-
ers.  Part I briefly examines the Internet.  Part II reviews interna-
tional jurisdiction and choice of law implications in intellectual 
property disputes concerning the Internet.  Part III analyzes the is-
sue of whether framing is copyright infringement under United 
States law.  This Article concludes that individuals from foreign 
nations who use American copyrights without authorization on 
foreign Internet service providers are subject to liability under the 
United States Copyright Act of 1976, through the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the international infringer. 
I. THE INTERNET 
A. The Significance of the Internet and the Scope of the 
Analysis 
The Internet2 is the term describing the world of electronic 
communications by the means of computer networks.  The idea to 
connect single computers within a network to enable users to ex-
change ideas and data came into existence in the beginning of the 
1960’s when Internet pioneers were envisioning the so called “Ga-
lactic Network.”3  Shortly after that, in 1965, the first data process-
ing connection between two remote computers via a telephone line 
had been established, although the circuit switched telephone line 
limited the “network’s” useful application.  Nevertheless, the first 
 
lennium Act on Oct. 28, 1998 into law, see the ‘Statement by the President’, (visited Nov. 
4, 1998) <http://www.dfc.org/issues/wipo/presidn.html>. 
2. The Internet sometimes is more colorfully referred to as ‘Cyberspace’. Legal 
commentators also call the Internet ‘Global Information Infrastructure’ (“GII”), see Jane 
C. Ginsburg, Global Use/Territorial Rights:  Private International Law Questions of the 
Global Information Infrastructure, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 318, 319 (1995) [here-
inafter Ginsburg, Global Use]; Andreas P. Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copy-
right Conflicts on Global Networks, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 799, 800 (1998); Stephen Fra-
ser, The Copyright Battle: Emerging International Rules and Roadblocks on the Global 
Information Infrastructure, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 159, 760 (1997). 
3. The envisioned network looked very much alike the Internet we have today, see 
Barry M. Leiner, A Brief History of the Internet, (visited July 26, 1998) < 
http:/www.isoc.org/Internet-history/#fricc>. 
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wide-area network had been built in 1965.4  Departing from the 
point of the first two-computer-network in the 1960’s and the sub-
sequent creation of the ARPANET, a military communication net-
work with three-hundred computers linked in 19815 a much more 
sophisticated technical standard gave rise to the Internet as it is 
known today.6  According to pertinent Internet growth-surveys, 
more than two million Web sites are available on the Internet.  The 
development of this number is depicted in the first graph in the 
Appendix, beginning in June 1993:7  The number of Internet hosts, 
starting with four in 1969, and domains, starting with 3.900 in 
1989, have also tremendously grown.  Following those numbers, 
the second and third graphs in the Appendix also provide a strong 
visual impression about the evolving significance of the Internet as 
well as they give an idea about the Internet’s importance in the 
near future.8 
 
4. See id. 
5. See Kevin M. Fitzmaurice and Renu N. Mody, International Shoe Meets the 
World Wide Web: Whither Personal Jurisdiction in Florida in the Age of the Internet?, 
71- FLA. B.J. 22 (1997). 
6. Currently, American companies and universities envision the high speed “Inter-
net 2”. The idea is to build it parallel to the existing Internet so that data of any amount 
can be securely transferred avoiding the pitfalls of the existing Internet like clogged elec-
tronic paths, see Robyn Meredith, The New York Times, Monday, February 2, 1998.  For 
a detailed historic outline with regard to the development of the Internet technology see 
Robert H’obbes’ Zakon, Hobbes’ Internet Timeline v.3.3 (visited July 26, 1998) 
<http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Internet/History/HIT.html>. 
7. See Appendix, infra p. 723 for an illustrative diagram. See also H’obbes’ Zakon, 
at <http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Internet/History/ HIT.html#Growth> (visited July 26, 
1998).  Robert H’obbes’ Zakon retains his information from various other sources such as 
the ‘Zone program reports’ maintained by Mark Lottor at <ftp://ftp.nw.com/pub/zone/> 
(visited July 26, 1998); the ‘Connectivity table’ maintained by Larry Landweber at 
<ftp://ftp.cs.wisc.edu/connectivity_table/> (visited July 26, 1998); the ‘Web growth 
summary page’ by Matthew Gray of MIT at 
<http://www.mit.edu/people/mkgray/net/web-growth-summary.html> (visited July 26, 
1998); and Netcraft at <http://www.netcraft.com/survey/> (visited July 26, 1998).  All 
sources can be verified through hyperlinks provided on Robert H’obbes’ Zakon’s Web 
site. 
8. See Appendix, infra p. 723 for an illustrative diagram. See also H’obbes’ Zakon, 
at <http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Internet/History/HIT.html # Growth> (visited July 
26, 1998).  More recent figures are even more dramatic: Following the newest survey by 
‘Matrix Information and Directory Services’ (MIDS),  restated in the German newspaper 
report, Massenauflauf im Cyberspace,  SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, July 28, 1998, there were 
102 million users connected to the Internet in January 1998.  Based on the fact that the 
number of Internet users double each year there will be, say MIDS, an estimated number 
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This booming quality of the Internet, expressed by the startling 
increase of the number of Web sites available and end users con-
nected to the Internet, is usually explained with the Internet’s po-
tential commercial value as well as with people’s general desire to 
disseminate information they consider worthwhile to disseminate.9 
Since contemporary technical standard makes it so easy to digi-
tize works of authorship in the first place making them accessible 
for everyone by posting and distributing them on the Internet, it 
goes without saying that the Internet challenges the existing pat-
terns of established law.  Contract law10 as well as criminal liabil-
ity11 and privacy issues12 are at stake.  However, the emerging law 
of the Internet particularly invokes the challenge of copyright 
law.13  Copyright protected works once digitized are much easier 
to copy than conventionally accessible works.14  Moreover, copies 
from a digitized work appear generally in the same quality as the 
original.15 
 
of 233 million user by the year 2000 and more than 700 million by 2001.  MIDS has a 
Web site at <http://www.mids.org> (visited July 28, 1998), however, the survey results 
were not (yet) available. 
9. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-
Tags: An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 243, 245 (1998). The 
most current and perhaps not only for the time being the most sensational information 
available on the Internet is the Ken Starr Report covering the intimate affair between the 
President Bill Clinton and a young White House intern consisting of more than 400 pages 
of thoroughly worked out details meant as a preparation to impeachment procedures 
aimed at the President, (visited Sept. 12, 1998) <http://starrreport.excite.com/ 
6narrit.htm#L28>. 
10. See JONATHAN ROSENOER, CYBERLAW: THE LAW OF THE INTERNET 237-41 (Lon-
don 1997) (dealing with the enforceability of electronic agreements); Mark A. Lemley, 
Intellectual Property and Shrink-wrap Licenses, S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995) [hereinafter 
Lemley, Shrink-wrap Licenses] (examining shrink-wrap licenses in Cyberspace). 
11. For an overview see ROSENOER, supra note 10, at 167-192. 
12. See id. at 129-141. 
13. Mike Godwin, Link Law on the Internet: A Panel Discussion, 38 IDEA: J.L. & 
TECH. 197 (1998). 
14. Particularly the Senate’s Judicial Committee, with regard to the Digital Millen-
nium Act, S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998), explicitly points out that “due to the ease 
with which digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually 
instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on 
the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive 
piracy.” 
15. However, copyright law is not the only part of intellectual property law that 
faces Internet related challenges. Trademark law is also affected, particularly concerning 
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A person who edits and provides digitized information and up-
loads it to the Internet might incorporate unauthorized copies of 
other individual’s work or infringe other rights exclusively as-
signed to the author of a copyright protected work.  Along the 
same line, Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) may be held liable 
for copyright infringement just by virtue of providing active and 
passive access to the Internet, thereby disseminating infringing 
work provided by third parties.16  Moreover, copyright infringe-
ment may occur just by transmitting a work through the Internet.  
Particularly the use of the World Wide Web, which is the most 
popular segment of the Internet,17 makes it easy to download and 
copy information desired by users who are interested in the infor-
mation provided.  Apart from the substantial copyright law, juris-
diction and choice of law issues have to be taken into consideration 
since the Internet works through a world wide network which does 
not stop at the border of one’s home country. 
This Article focuses on copyright infringement and liability 
from the point of view of an Internet content provider, whose Web 
page is being framed.  In order to invoke jurisdictional and choice 
of law issues, it is assumed that a German citizen living in Ger-
many using a German Internet service provider (“ISP”) frames a 
Web site provided by a United States citizen living in the United 
States.  The consumer, respectively the end user, of the framed 
Web site will be a United States citizen as well accessing the Web 
site from the United States. 
 
domain name disputes and the use of trademark-protected logos, signs and names used by 
third parties on their Web sites. For a current comprehensive overview as to trademark 
protection, including federal and state dilution, see Jeffrey R. Kuester and Peter A. 
Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-Tags: An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 
J. L. & TECH. 243, 247-53 (1998). 
16. See Religious Technology Center, v. Netcom On-Line Communication Service, 
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  For a closer discussion of the ISP’s liability 
see infra at 713. 
17. Other applications of the Internet are e-mail, bulletin boards, file transfer proto-
col, and telnet, see NABARRO NATHANSON, THE LAWS OF THE INTERNET 4-8 (1997), for a 
concise description of those features. 
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B. What Exactly is Framing? 
In order to understand the significance of the term ‘framing’ 
one must understand how the World Wide Web functions.  The 
World Wide Web consists of countless Web pages providing in-
formation.  Those Web pages have, to make each Web page indi-
vidually accessible, a particular URL-address assigned to it.  A 
Web page is usually written in ‘Hypertext Mark-up Language’ 
(“HTML”) allowing it to incorporate Hypertext References 
(“HREF”), the ‘links’ which are designed to direct the attention of 
the user to other Web page which are usually related to the content 
of the Web page being visited.  An anchor that is electronically in-
corporated in the document being viewed represents such a link.  
The anchor may consist of particular words, sentences, or para-
graphs, marked as anchor by usually underlining them.  By click-
ing the computer’s pointing device, a mouse, on the anchor the 
web browser immediately loads the URL-address of the linked 
Web pages and transfers to it enabling the user to view the linked 
Web page.18 
Whereas linking just provides a reference point to the docu-
ment being viewed without really incorporating it into one’s own 
Web page,19 framing goes farther.  It is based on the modern Inter-
net browser technology with its ability to open a number of frames 
on the screen for direct viewing of different Web pages containing 
 
18. For a concise description of hypertext reference technology see Richard S. 
Vermut, File Caching on the Internet: Technical Infringement or Safeguard for efficient 
Network operation, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 273, 287 (1997); Richard Raysman & Peter 
Brown, Dangerous Liasons: The Legal Risks of Linking Web Sites, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 8, 
1997, at 3. 
19. Simply linking does not seem to constitute copyright infringement since a hy-
pertext linked Web site seems to be just an instruction to connect to an other work rather 
than actually use of it.  Moreover those who upload information on the World Wide Web 
implicitly intend to have their documents viewed, therefore uploading documents perhaps 
grants an implied license to link, see Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renais-
sance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law could be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 46 (1997); see also Maureen A. O’Rourke, Fencing Cyber-
space: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MIN L. R. 610, 658-662 (1998); German 
legal commentators share this interpretation with regard to linking, see Frank A. Koch, 
Grundlagen des Urheberrechtschutz im Internet und in On-line-Diensten, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT (GRUR) 1997, 417, 430. 
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text, graphics or other HTML elements.20  This technique gives the 
end user the advantage to browse different Web sites with related 
information at the same time.21  Moreover, framing enables a Web 
site operator to incorporate remote Web sites completely into the 
Web site the end user actually called upon without terminating the 
connection to this Web site.22  Thus, when a framed Web site is 
called upon by clicking on the link’s anchor, the linked Web page 
may appear in part on screen surrounded by a frame that is pro-
vided by the “framing” Web page, which is the Web page the end 
user actually called upon.23  The frame often depicts logos, adver-
tisement, or promotions placed by the author of the framing Web 
site.  The logos, advertisement, or promotions of the framed Web 
site are sometimes covered by the frame and invisible to the end 
user.  The frame then may generate the impression that the viewer 
is actually viewing information coming from the originating fram-
ing metasite, instead of from the linked site.24  But not only does 
the frame generate this impression, the URL does as well, because 
the URL displayed in the browser is the framing site’s address and 
not the site’s address actually being framed.25 
In a case recently before the court of the Southern District of 
New York26 the plaintiffs, among them the Washington Post, com-
plained that the defendant, Total News, Inc., an Internet content 
provider, hosted a Web site consisting of framing links to the 
Washington Post’s and other news provider’s Web sites. Accord-
ing to the complaint,27 viewers of the defendant’s Web site were 
 
20. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 18, at 3.  This feature is comparable with 
window’s multitasking feature making it possible to run a number of applications on the 
computer and to display them at the same time. 
21. See Ellen Poler, Frames and License Agreements, (visited July 26, 1998) 
<http://www.collegehill.com/ilp-news/poler1.html>. 
22. See id.; see also Raysman & Brown, supra note 18, at 3. 
23. For future reference this Web page will be called the ‘framing’ Web page. 
24. See David Phillips & Elizabeth Blumenfeld, Seams in a Seamless Web, 482 
PLI/PAT 65, 72 (1997). 
25. See Use of Frames to Incorporate Third-Party Content in Web Site Sparks Con-
troversy, 13 COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST 8, n. 13 (1997). 
26. Washington Post v. Total News, Inc., No. 97-1190 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 20, 
1997). 
27. See Complaint, Washington Post v. Total News, Inc. (No. 97-1190) (visited 
May 10, 1999) <http://www.ljx.com/internet/complain.html>; see also James A. Kirk-
land, Emerging Internet Copyright Issues, 482 PLI/PAT 531, 544 (1997), who restates and 
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able to choose the plaintiff’s anchor transferring them to a corre-
sponding Web site showing the news provided by the plaintiff and 
framed by the defendant depicting its own advertisement and 
logo.28  The parties settled the case.29  As for the settlement, the de-
fendants agreed to permanently refrain from causing plaintiffs Web 
site to appear and to cease the practice of framing.  However, the 
parties stipulated that defendants may link to plaintiff’s Web sites 
via hyperlinks consisting of the linked sites in plain text.30  This 
case demonstrates the significance of the question of whether 
framing infringes the author’s exclusive rights granted by the 
Copyright Act of 1976 [“Copyright Act”].31  Moreover, it shows 
that framing represents, since no precedent is available,32 an unset-
tled area of law.33 
 
cites the complaint. 
28. See Complaint, Washington Post v. Total News, Inc. (No. 97-1190) (visited 
May 10, 1999) <http://www.ljx.com/internet/complain.html>; see also Kenneth Freeling 
& Joseph E. Levi, Frame Liability Clouds the Internet’s Future, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1997, 
at S5. 
29. See Washington Post v. Total News, Inc., No. 97-1190 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1997) 
(stipulation and order of settlement and dismissal).  The stipulation and order is available 
on the Internet at <http://www.ljx.com/internet/totalse.html> (visited May 10, 1999). 
30. See id. 
31. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1010 (West Supp. 1999)).  Apart from copyright issues, the causes 
of action in Total News were misappropriation, federal trademark dilution, federal trade-
mark infringement, false designation of origin, false representation and false advertising, 
as well as trademark infringement, dilution and unfair competition under state law, de-
ceptive acts and practices, and tortious interference. For a concise analysis of the case see 
Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-Tags: An Intellec-
tual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA J. L. & TECH. 243, 271 (1998). 
32. In Futuredontics Inc. v. Applied Anagramic Inc., the defendant Applied Ana-
gramic Inc. allegedly framed the plaintiff Futuredontics’ Web site. See No. 97-6691 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1998) (reported in 55 PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL, 
315 (1998)).  The district court rejected the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction 
as well as the defendant’s subsequent motion to dismiss finding that plaintiff has suffi-
ciently alleged a claim for copyright infringement. See id.  The United States Court of 
Appeals, Ninth Circuit affirmed. See Futuredontics Inc. v. Applied Anagramic Inc., 152 
F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision). 
33. There is, nevertheless, some technical relief against framing available.  The fol-
lowing java script will automatically remove any existing frames: 
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE=JAVASCRIPT> 
<!— 
if  (top.frames.length!=0) 
   top.location=self.document.location; 
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II. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW 
Recalling the hypothetical,34 it is reasonable to assume that the 
German content provider and his or her ISP might be responsible 
for the allegedly infringing use of the framed Web site and that 
they should be held liable for the damage they allegedly caused.  
Since a suit should be brought against them in the United States, 
two things are necessarily required.  First, it has to be determined 
whether United States courts can exercise international personal 
jurisdiction over the German defendants and second, in case it can, 
what the applicable law is. 
A. International Personal Jurisdiction 
First, the general principles regarding international personal ju-
risdiction will be extracted from the pertinent law before those 




An alternative to the foregoing javascript is: 
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE=JAVASCRIPT> 
<!— 
function breakOut ()  { 
   if  (self  !=  top) 
    window.open (“my URL”, “_top”, ““); 
} 
//  —> 
</SCRIPT> 
</HEAD> 
<BODY onLoad=“breakOut ()”> 
Web Design Group, HTML Help by The Web Design Group (last modified Jan. 23, 1999) 
<http://www.htmlhelp.com/design/frames/faq/framed.html>.  For technical relief see also 
Chuck Muscanio, The Best Way to FRAME-Proof your Pages, boost table speed, & 
more, (visited May 10, 1999) <http://www.netscapeworld.com/netscapeworld/nw-05-
1997/nw-05-html.html>; Still more Tricks to FRAME-Proofing your pages, plus . . . (vis-
ited May 10, 1999) <http://www.netscapeworld.com/netscapeworld/nw-07-1997/nw-07-
html.html>.  However, there is, as David G. Post points out, no ultimate technical relief 
against framing since antiframing technology will soon be fought with anti-antiframing 
technology leading to “a kind of technological arms race”, see David G. Post, Plugging 
In: Has Cyberspace Law Come of Age, AM. LAW., April 1998, at 8. 
34. The hypothetical is of a German citizen living in Germany using a German ISP 
frames a Web site provided by a United States citizen living in the United States.  The 
end user, of the framed Web site will be a United States citizen as well who accesses the 
Web site from the United States. 
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hypothetical.35 
1. General Principles 
Any given State’s authority to affect its legal interests is ac-
cepted as a general principle.  This principle is commonly de-
scribed by the term “jurisdiction.”  Traditionally, three kinds of ju-
risdictions are distinguished: legislative, judicial, and enforcement 
jurisdiction.36 
a. Jurisdiction to Legislate 
The settled principle that countries have authority to affect 
their legal interests particularly to persons and circumstances does 
not mean that countries are free to legislate whatever they want.  It 
is generally accepted as a basic rule that a country’s authority to 
legislate ends where legitimate interests of other countries are af-
fected.  Within this framework of diverse interests states generally 
recognize that whatever happens on the territory of a country is of 
that country’s primary concern.  This principle is called the territo-
riality principle.  It is also recognized that a country has a signifi-
cant interest in exercising jurisdiction over persons or things that 
possess its nationality, the nationality principle, as well as the in-
terest in protecting its nationals from conduct outside its territory, 
the passive nationality principle.  In addition, countries have the 
right to protect themselves against hostile acts (protective princi-
ple) and finally there are certain activities universally condemned 
(universal principle).37 
In accordance with these general principles just pointed out, the 
section 402 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations further 
summarizes the legitimate interest countries have to exercise juris-
diction.  It provides that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law 
with respect to: 
 
35. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
36. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1046 (3d ed. 1993).  The juris-
diction to enforce will not be discussed since it is not relevant in the context of the pur-
pose of this Article. 
37. Id. at 1049; the protective and the universal principles will not be discussed 
since they are not relevant in the context of the purpose of this Article as well, for a dis-
cussion of those aspects see id. at 1081-3. 
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(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes 
place within its territory; 
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present 
within its territory; 
(c)  conduct outside its territory that has or is intended 
to have substantial effect within its territory; 
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nation-
als outside as well as within its territory; and 
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its 
nationals that is directed against the security of the state or 
against a limited class of other state interests.38 
The principle of territoriality is well established and free from 
controversy.  As early as 1812 the courts had recognized that “[t]he 
jurisdiction [to legislate] of the nation within its own territory is 
necessarily exclusive and absolute” and that a restriction upon it 
would diminish a country’s sovereignty.39  Thus, no foreign coun-
try has the right to legislate another country’s laws.  Along the 
same line it is basically noncontroversial that a country has the 
right to regulate the conduct of its citizens or nationals anywhere in 
the world.40 The passive nationality principle might be invoked 
when an act committed in one state causes injury in the territory of 
another state.  Even though the act did not take place in the terri-
tory of one state, jurisdiction can be established there on the fact 
that the injurious effect took place in the territory.41 
b. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate 
Jurisdiction to adjudicate is defined as a country’s authority to 
subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administra-
tive tribunals.42  The exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate does not 
 
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1986). 
39. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). 
40. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). 
41. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 
1945); BERNHARD H. OXMAN, JURISDICTION OF STATES, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 277 (Rudolf Bernhard ed., Installment 10, 1987). 
42. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 1-488 
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apply to any person.  Countries are rather somewhat restricted by 
reasonableness.  With regard to this reasonableness, section 421 of 
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations points out that “[a] 
state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to adjudicate with 
respect to a person or thing if the relationship of the state to the 
person or thing is such as to make the exercise of jurisdiction rea-
sonable.”43  In other words, the relationship of a person to a coun-
try determines whether the exercise of jurisdiction over this person 
is reasonable.  This idea of a relationship test in United States law 
differs quite substantially from the principle ‘actor sequitur forum 
rei’44 which is the starting point of any personal jurisdiction analy-
sis in most of the country’s international civil procedure laws.45  
Applying the ‘actor sequitur forum rei’ standard to the framer lo-
cated in Germany would lead to the conclusion that an action 
against the alleged infringer would have to be brought before Ger-
man courts.  In the United States, however, plaintiffs, considering 
the home forum as the most favorable, seek to show that a defen-
dant has minimum contacts with the plaintiff’s forum.46 
2. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate in the United States 
When dealing with the United States’ jurisdiction to adjudicate, 
one has to distinguish between the United States’ subject matter ju-
risdiction and the United States’ territorial Jurisdiction. 
a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The subject matter jurisdiction in the United States is highly 
determined by the existence of two independent court systems, 
commonly regarded as the systems of the federal courts and the 
states courts.  As a basic rule, subject matter jurisdiction is gener-
 
(1986). 
43. Id. § 421(1) 
44. The plaintiff follows the defendant to the latter’s forum. 
45. See Reinhold Geimer, INTERNATIONALS ZIVILPROZESSRECHT, 2. Aufl. 1993, 
Margin No. 298; Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyber-
space: Which States may Regulate the Internet, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 146 (1996). 
46. See MARYLIN J. RAISCH & ROBERTA I. SHAFFER, INTRODUCTION TO 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL TRANSACTIONS 42 (New York 1995), (considering, from the 
United States point of view, the choice of the plaintiff’s forum in international litigation 
simply as a matter of practicability). 
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ally granted to the state courts.  However, Article III, section 2 of 
the United States Constitution allows the legislator to designate 
specific subject matter to the exclusive or concurrent federal juris-
diction.47  In diversity cases Congress has chosen a nonexclusive 
federal jurisdiction.  The diversity statute prescribes in that respect 
that “[t]he [federal] district courts have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of 
value of  $ 75,000.00 exclusive of interest and cost and is be-
tween . . . citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign 
state.”48  More specifically with regard to the hypothetical, the pat-
ent jurisdiction statute prescribes exclusive jurisdiction of federal 
courts in copyright cases.49  Since the hypothetical is clearly a 
copyright case, which is, in addition, characterized by diverse na-
tionality, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction regardless of 
the value of the case and no state court in the United States is per-
mitted to hear the case. 
b. Territorial Jurisdiction 
Traditionally, a prerequisite to exercise jurisdiction over a per-
son was the physical presence of this person in the forum.50 How-
ever, modern business life, particularly the increased mobility 
granted by modern means of transportation and communication 
and commercial transactions involving parties located in the whole 
country, challenged the standard of the physical forum presence.51  
As a consequence, courts began exercising jurisdiction over indi-
viduals who were not present in the court’s forum.  This practice 
lead to the development of the minimum contact standard. 
 
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2) (1994). 
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (a) (1994) 
50. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of Unemployment 
Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945). 
51. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Charles S. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 
(1980). 
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(1) Minimum Contacts Standard 
On the assumption that individuals can be present in a forum 
without constantly being physically there, the Supreme Court, 
based on the Constitution’s Due Process clause,52 prevents state 
courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over defendants who 
lack sufficient contacts with the forum state.53 Hence, state courts 
have personal jurisdiction over an individual not present in the fo-
rum if the individual has established minimum contacts with the 
forum. 
Although the Supreme Court ruled with regard to a conflict be-
tween two parties located in the United States, the minimum con-
tacts rule applies as well to a foreign defendant.54 The underlying 
concept of the minimum contact test deriving from the due process 
clause is to preserve the sovereignty of the states in the federal sys-
tem and to grant the right to a defendant to affiliate himself with 
one or another of those sovereigns.55 Countries are obviously sov-
ereign too so the same reasoning applies with respect to personal 
jurisdiction of a foreign defendant. 
The Supreme Court in International Shoe56 distinguished be-
tween the two classes of jurisdictional situations with regard to the 
defendant’s contacts.  The Supreme Court specifically distin-
guished between “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdic-
tion”.57  The former invokes the permission of general jurisdiction 
over an individual if her contacts with the forum are systematic 
and continuous enough that the defendant might anticipate defend-
 
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. V for Federal Government action and U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV Section 1 for State action. 
53. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315. 
54. See Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano 
County, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (holding that the minimum contact doctrine applies 
where the defendant is a Japanese national). 
55. See Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World without Borders, 1 VA. J. L. & TECH. 
3, 26 (1997) (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 253, 251; World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293(1980); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie 
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-3 n. 10 (1982)). 
56. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315. 
57. See Burk, supra note 55, at 26. 
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ing any type of claim there.58  The latter comes into play when the 
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum in such a way that 
she might anticipate defending that particular type of claim there.59  
It is needless to say that the German defendants in the hypothetical 
lack any systematic and continuos contacts with the United States 
and that they do not anticipate  defending any type of claim there. 
The lack of general jurisdiction leads to the more difficult 
question of whether the German defendants from the hypothetical 
are subject to specific jurisdiction.  Here it needs to be analyzed 
whether the German defendants from the hypothetical might an-
ticipate defending a copyright claim in the United States based on 
the conduct of framing.  When analyzing the specific jurisdiction 
the Supreme Court considers the foreseeability that a defendant 
will become subject to suit in a particular forum and, in addition, 
certain other ‘fairness factors’. 
(a) Foreseeability 
In World Wide Volkswagen the Supreme Court held that fore-
seeability does not just imply “the mere likelihood that a product 
will find its way into the forum state.”60  Rather, “it is that the de-
fendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such 
that she should reasonably anticipate being hauled into court 
there.”61 The Supreme Court pointed out that a defendant has clear 
notice that she is subject to suit when she “purposefully avails” 
herself of the privileges and the advantage of conducting activities 
within the forum state.62 It is clear that doing business with the aim 
of direct pecuniary gain in the forum state enhances the possibility 
of becoming involved in suit and renders it foreseeable for the de-
fendant to become subject of a law suit.63 The contact inquiry in a 
case involving a foreign defendant may consider minimum con-
tacts with the United States as a whole, rather than with any par-
 
58. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of Unemployment 
Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945). 
59. See id. 
60. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293(1980). 
61. Id. at 297. 
62. Id. 
63. See Burk, supra note 55, at 26. 
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ticular state.64 Where there is an express contract forming the basis 
for the party’s business in the forum, state foreseeability is easily 
to be inferred.65 
(b) Fairness Factors 
Relying on its ruling in International Shoe, where the court 
held that once minimum contacts between the defendant and the 
forum state have been established, it has to be determined whether 
the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with the “traditional 
conception of fair play and substantial justice”,66 the Supreme 
Court enunciated five jurisdictional fairness factors to be consid-
ered in a separate assessment.  In appropriate cases courts “may 
evaluate [1] the burden on the defendant, [2] the forum State’s in-
terest in adjudicating the dispute, [3] the plaintiff’s interest in ob-
taining convenient and effective relief, [4] the interstate judicial 
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of con-
troversies, and [5] the shared interest of the several States in fur-
thering fundamental substantive social policies”.67 To render juris-
diction unreasonable the fairness factors need to be compelling to 
outweigh the fact that an individual has purposefully availed him-
self of the forum.68 Apart from the five fairness factors, when the 
defendant is a foreign national, the procedural and substantive 
policies of the other nation whose interests are affected by the as-
sertion of jurisdiction have to be considered as well on a case by 
case basis.69 
 
64. See Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano 
County, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (indicating, however, that “[g]reat care and reserve should be 
exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into international field.”); 
see also Burk, supra note 55, at 26. 
65. See Burger King Corp. v. John Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 480 (1985). 
66. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of Unemployment 
Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945). 
67. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477; however, factors number 4 and 5 do not seem 
to be of much relevance in an international setting. 
68. Id. 
69. See Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano 
County, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987). 
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(2) Jurisdiction in the Internet 
With regard to the hypothetical, the specific jurisdiction analy-
sis leads to the question of whether the German ISP or the German 
framer or both could reasonably foresee being sued in a United 
States court by having purposefully availed themselves of the 
privileges and the advantage of conducting activities within the 
United States.  More specifically, the question arises of what kind 
of Internet related conduct justifies the assumption of a purposeful 
availment. 
A number of cases in the United States have already dealt with 
jurisdiction issues in the context of the Internet.  In Compuserve v. 
Patterson,70 for example, the court found that the defendant had 
purposefully availed herself of the plaintiff’s headquarters forum 
because the latter was posting the defendant’s software and trans-
mitting the fees for downloaded software the defendant had writ-
ten.  In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King71, to the contrary, juris-
diction could not be established due to the lack of purposeful 
availment.  The defendant had created a Web site containing in-
formation about its jazz club in Columbia, Missouri, whose name 
(“The Blue Note”) was identical with the name of a jazz club in 
New York.  The plaintiff sued for trademark infringement in New 
York and the court ruled that a passive Web page just posting in-
formation cannot be the basis for purposeful availment.72  The 
court pointed out that the argument that the defendant “should have 
foreseen that users could access the site in New York and be con-
fused as to the relationship of the two Blue Note clubs is insuffi-
cient to satisfy due process.”73 In a later case, the Ninth Circuit de-
veloped a solution which seems to be mediating between the two 
opposite approaches the courts in Compuserve and in Bensusan 
advanced.  This solution could be called the ‘Interactivity ap-
proach’. 
 
70. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
71. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d 
126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). 
72. See id. at 301. 
73. Id. 
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(a) The Interactivity Approach 
In Cybersell v. Cybersell,74 where the plaintiff claimed that the 
defendant infringed the former’s trademark by setting up a Web 
page under the plaintiff’s name “Cybersell,”75 the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished between passive and interactive Web pages.  A pas-
sive Web site, the court held, does nothing more than permitting 
anyone to access it and to view the information.  This can be com-
pared to the placement of a product into the stream of commerce 
that may be felt everywhere but is not an act purposefully directed 
toward the forum state.76  An interactive Web site, on the other 
side, allows users to exchange information and encourages to 
communicate.77  The opportunity to exchange and communicate 
information indicates that the content provider directed her activity 
in a substantial way to the forum.78  Along the same line in other 
cases district courts also considered that the “notion of transacting 
business over the Internet involves examining the level of Interac-
tivity.”79 
With regard to the hypothetical the user can do more than just 
accessing and viewing the Web site.  He can also actively choose 
to click on the anchor that provides the link to the framed Web site.  
Instantly after activating the link the framed Web page will be 
downloaded80 into the end user’s computer and can be viewed on 
the computer screen.  The framing Web site, therefore, can be con-
sidered as interactive.81 
 
74. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). 
75. Id. at 415. 
76. See id. at 418. 
77. See id. 
78. Id. 
79. See, e.g., Resuscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., 
No. IP 96-1457-C-M/S, 1997 WL 148567 at **1, 4 (S.D. Ind. 1997); see also SF Hotel 
Company, L.P. v. Energy Investments, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D. Kan. 1997); 
Zippo Manufacturing Co., v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 952 F. Supp 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 
1997). 
80. For the purpose of simplification in the context of this Article, the term “down-
loading” refers to the storage of information derived from the Internet into the computer’s 
RAM unless otherwise indicated. 
81. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright without Borders?  Choice of Forum and 
Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153, 160 
(1997) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright without Borders].  Prof. Ginsburg argues along 
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However, those courts distinguishing interactive Web pages 
from passive ones, and favoring interactive Web pages with regard 
to the determination of personal jurisdiction, also emphasis that 
there must be something in addition to plain interactivity to estab-
lish purposeful availment.  This additional element is the commer-
cial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the web 
site.82  Usually, courts infer the commercial nature of the exchange 
from either the sales they have generated through the Web page or 
from e-mail communication directed at the making of a sale.  The 
defendants in those cases allegedly either transacted business over 
the Internet or solicited business over the Internet.83  Obviously, 
none of those activities occur with regard to the hypothetical be-
cause it is generally not the framing Web page operator’s intent to 
enter into a contract of any kind with an end user who downloads 
the framing Web page.84  But, nevertheless, the operator wants the 
 
the same line using the following hypothetical:  Former French President Francois Mit-
terand died in January 1996. Shortly after his death, his physician published a memoir 
(“Le Grand Secret”) describing that the late President was not able to exercise his office 
towards the end of his second presidency. See id. at 153-54.  The late President’s family 
invoked France’s post mortem privacy right and stopped further dissemination of the 
memoirs. See id.  A French Web page operator, however, had the book already scanned 
and posted it on the Internet with the opportunity to download. See id. (citing Michel Al-
berganti & Herve Morin, Internet contourne la censure du livre du docteur Gubler, LE 
MONDE, Jan. 25, 1996.).  In her hypothetical, Prof. Ginsburg assumed that the Web site 
operator had uploaded her files to a United States Web site, and that the French copyright 
owners had sought to prevent dissemination of the work in the United States.  See Gins-
burg, Copyright without Borders, supra at 166 (concluding that “the out of state Web site 
that offers Le Grand Secret is ‘interactive’: it does not simply inform users that they can 
buy the book elsewhere (or through other media); it enables to acquire it directly from the 
site.”). 
82. See Cybersell 130 F.3d at 418; Resuscitation, 1997 WL 148567 at * 4; SF Hotel 
Company, 985 F. Supp. 1032 at 1034. 
83. Examples for cases where business was transacted are: CompuServe v. Patter-
son, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Digital Equipment Corp. v. Altavista Technology, 
Inc., 960 F. Supp 456 (D. Mass. 1997); Hall v. Laronde, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1342 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2d, Div. 6 1997); Resuscitation, 1997 WL 148567 at *1.  Examples for cases 
where business was solicited are: Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc. 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1170 (D. Ma. 1997); Zippo v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp 1119 (W.D. Penn. 
1997); EDIAS Software international, L.L.C., v. Basis International Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 
413 (D. Ariz. 1996); Hereos Inc. v. Hereos Foundation, 958 F. Supp 1 (D.D.C. 1996); 
Maritz, Inc., v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
84. However, it might be theoretically possible that it is the framing Web page op-
erator’s intent to enter into a contract with the end user depending on what kind of busi-
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end user to access a particular site through her own framing Web 
site to ensure that her advertisement will be visible on the end us-
ers computer screen.  For that reason, the framing Web page does 
not just simply inform the end user that there is the particular site 
out there, which can be accessed under its particular URL.  It also 
does not offer a plain link to the particular site as a shortcut.  The 
Web page enables the end user to download, or to acquire, the par-
ticular Web site directly within the framing Web site.85  A process, 
which, if not authorized by the framed Web page’s copyright 
owner, would amount to copyright infringement.  Moreover, see-
ing the end user’s click on the link as a request to get access to the 
framed Web site and the fact that access is actually granted as the 
immediate positive response to the request allows to infer that the 
end user and the Web site operator actually communicate with 
each other, even though, admittedly, in a very limited technical 
fashion.  Nevertheless, the opportunity to request a download and 
then to actually acquire the copyright protected information by ini-
tializing the communication seems to be sufficiently equivalent to 
the exchange of information recognized by the courts to establish 
purposeful availment.  Following this conclusion the question re-
mains, however, whether the exchange of information is also 
commercial in nature.  One surely could argue that the Web site 
operator just as the framer derives her revenue from selling adver-
tisement space to third parties.  The more hits her Web page re-
ceives the more revenue she will derive.  Communication with the 
end user leads to the receipt of a hit and thus increases the Web 
page operator’s revenue.  That in turn renders the communication 
at least in some sense indirectly of commercial nature.  However, 
the relevant cases indicate the necessity of a direct commercial re-
lationship between the Web site operator and the end user.  There-
fore, it would certainly be too overbroad to acknowledge calling on 
a framing Web page as communication of commercial nature.  But 
it appears to be equivalent to communication of commercial nature 
when, as it is the case in the context of framing, the communica-
tion has some sort of an impact on the copyrights of an United 
 
ness the operator pursues. 
85. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
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States citizen.86 
However, when recognizing the communication in the context 
of framing as having an impact on the copyright owner’s rights 
and, at the same time, as an equivalent to communication of com-
mercial nature, then the question arises whether the Web site needs 
to have received a sufficiently large number of hits or whether the 
Web site’s potential accessibility by virtue of being posted on the 
Internet would be sufficient.  In order to counterbalance the lack of 
the commercial nature of the communication, a sufficiently large 
number of hits might be required to recognize purposeful avail-
ment in the context of framing in an international setting.  How-
ever, unlike in the real world with respect to real goods, an Internet 
user does not need to specifically order from a particular provider 
the information she wants.  Moreover, the ordered information 
does not need to be actively shipped to the customer.  Thus, in the 
context of the Internet, there is no specific interaction necessary 
between the providing and the consuming parties since the Inter-
net’s content is in fact permanently and ubiquitously available to 
be downloaded.  Furthermore, somebody calling on a Web page 
usually has no knowledge as to the Web page operator’s or the 
ISP’s geographic location.87  In the context of pertinent minimum 
contacts standard, this permanent availability and the lack of 
knowledge about the party’s location as unique features to the 
Internet, may invoke the argument that it is unnecessary for the 
user in the forum to interact with the Web site.  As well, the poten-
tial for interaction with the Web site by virtue of it being posted on 
the Internet is sufficient to find purposeful availment. 
The following, however, will show that the law requires that a 
framing Web page actually was accessed and that it actually must 
have been accessed by a number of visitors in order find purpose-
ful availment. 
 
86. The impact approach excludes plain linking and caching of Web pages from 
purposeful availment scrutiny since both conducts are clearly covered by an implied li-
cense granted by the Web page’s copyright owner.  Plain linking and caching, therefore, 
has no impact on copyright owner’s rights.  For a more detailed analysis of the implied 
license doctrine in the context of the Internet, see infra Part II.B.2.a.(1).(b). 
87. The URL is not a reliable indicator since its extensions like ‘.de’ which stands 
for Germany or “.uk” which points to the United Kingdom might be operated and main-
tained from anywhere in the world. 
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(b) Access 
In Maritz v. Cybergold the district court in eastern district of 
Missouri implicitly addressed the problem and recognized jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.88  The court found that “[b]y simply set-
ting up, and posting information at, a Web site in the form of an 
advertisement or solicitation, one has done everything necessary to 
reach the global Internet audience.”89  The court then concluded 
that “while modern technology has made nationwide commercial 
transactions simpler and more feasible, even for small businesses, 
it must broaden correspondingly the permissible scope of jurisdic-
tion excerciseable by the courts.”90  By contrast a district court in 
Arizona also seemed to rely on mere accessibility as such without 
paying attention to the question whether the Web site actually had 
visitors or not.91  The court simply concluded that “[the defendant] 
should not be permitted to take advantage of modern technology 
through an Internet web page and forum and simultaneously es-
cape traditional notions of jurisdiction.”92 
Both foregoing court decisions indicate that an interactive Web 
site by virtue of being accessible or, from the content provider’s 
perspective, by the mere invitation to visit a Web site by making it 
available on the Internet, is sufficient to find purposeful availment 
to the United States.  Following this approach, it is reasonably 
foreseeable for the German content provider from the hypothetical 
to be sued in the United States. Since the German content pro-
vider’s ISP made it possible for the framer to avail himself of the 
United States forum, the ISP, by virtue of contributing to the 
availment, also established minimum contacts in that respect.93 
However, considering the applicable Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure, it appears to be doubtful whether federal courts can exer-
cise international personal jurisdiction just by virtue of having a 
framing Web site being accessible through the Internet. 
 
88. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
89. Id. at 1332. 
90. Id. at 1334. 
91. EDIAS Software international, L.L.C., v. Basis International Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 
413 (D. Arizona 1996). 
92. Id. at 420. 
93. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
BURMEISTER.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:37 PM 
650 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 9:625 
(c) Rule 4 (k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 4 (k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deals with 
the territorial limits of state court jurisdiction and with the federal 
court jurisdiction as well, the latter following the former conse-
quently.  Particularly, Rule 4 (k)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure states the very principle that “[s]ervice of sum-
mons or filing a waiver of service is effective to establish [federal] 
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who could be subjected 
to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in 
which the district court is located.”94  This provision indicates that, 
as a general rule, the district court situated in that state that would 
have jurisdiction over the particular defendant, is the appropriate 
one.95  For that reason, it is appropriate to assess whether and if 
necessary under which circumstances state jurisdiction can be es-
tablished against the German defendants. Considering that the 
framing Web site is ubiquitously available, any state may be af-
fected by the defendant’s conduct. 
Generally, the state court’s jurisdiction is limited to the citizens 
of the particular state where the state court is situated.  Exercising 
personal jurisdiction in an international context therefore depends 
on the states so called long-arm statutes that provide rules for the 
state’s right to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defen-
dant.  The provisions of those long arm statutes must be satisfied to 
establish the consequential federal court jurisdiction as well,96 un-
less the defendant is amenable to the federal court’s exercise of the 
jurisdiction.97 
For example the New York long-arm statute, section 302 of 
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, provides two possible 
 
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (k)(1)(A). 
95. See STEVAN BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.5  
(1997). 
96. See Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F 3d 1503, 1506-7 (10th Cir. 1995). The court 
denied federal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant because the state’s long arm stat-
ute did not apply. See id. at 1508. 
97. See, e.g., Maritz, Inc., v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (E.D. Mo. 
1996) (where the court raised the federal jurisdiction question but has not made a deci-
sion since the defendant consented to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction). 
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bases for asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.98  
The first possibility makes jurisdiction depend on “commit[ing] a 
tortious act within the state.”99  The second possibility is based on 
tortious acts committed outside the state but causes injury within 
the state and which demands the defendant’s reasonable expecta-
tion that its acts have in-state consequences.  Furthermore, the de-
fendant must have “derive[d] substantial revenue from interstate or 
international commerce.”100 
Applying the second alternative with regard to the hypothetical 
the German framer puts up her link without deriving any revenue 
from international commerce at all and neither does the ISP.  The 
framer might only, if at all, gain revenue from selling space for ad-
vertisement on her Web page and the ISP makes her living only by 
selling its service in Germany primarily to German customers.  
There is no revenue from international commerce to be found and 
both, neither the framer nor her ISP aim for revenue from interna-
tional commerce.101  It is, therefore, impossible to apply the New 
York’s long-arm statute in this respect.  Furthermore, long-arm ju-
risdiction cannot be established by applying the first alternative as 
well because no tortious act will be committed in New York just 
by virtue of the potential accessibility of the Web site.  Moreover, 
downloading might actually not create a copy in the computer’s 
RAM as legal commentators and European authorities are cur-
rently proposing,102 thereby suggesting that framing does not lead 
to a tort at all.  The lack of state court jurisdiction103 necessarily 
 
98. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 1998).  It appears to be reasonable to choose 
New York as an example for a long arm statute scrutiny since New York City is the 
United States’ and perhaps the world’s most important international business metropolis. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
101. The sale of advertisement space to New York companies by the German Web 
site operator is conceivably what could then actually constitute international commerce. 
102. Many legal commentators have criticized the proposition taken by the Ninth 
Circuit in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); see 
also David Post, New Wine, Old Bottles: The Evanescent Copy, AM. LAW, May 1995, at 
103. In Europe the Council of the European Community’s proposal for a directive seem 
to suggest that a copy in the RAM is merely transitory and not constituting copyright in-
fringement, see Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Har-
monization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Soci-
ety, COM (97) 628 Final (Oct. 12, 1997), art. 2, cmt. 3. 
103. This is true for New York.  Other states, such as California, might have 
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leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to establish federal ju-
risdiction as well since, applying Rule 4 (k)(1)(A) of the federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, state court long-arm jurisdiction is a pre-
condition to establish federal jurisdiction in that particular state. As 
a consequence, the German framer and her ISP seem to be off the 
hook. 
However, Rule 4 (k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
does provide relief.104  Rule 4 (k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides: “[i]f the exercise of [federal] jurisdiction is 
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States serv-
ing a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with 
respect to claims arising under federal law, to establish personal 
jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not subject to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.”105  
Rule 4 (k) (2) particularly exposes foreign defendants to federal ju-
risdiction under two conditions.  First, the claim needs to arise un-
der federal law and second, foreign defendants need to have suffi-
cient contacts with the United States as a whole but lack sufficient 
contacts with any state to support personal jurisdiction under the 
states long-arm statute.106 Both  requirements are easily met since 
all state or common copyright law is preempted by the Federal 
Copyright Act,107 and state’s long-arm statutes do not provide gen-
eral jurisdiction as provided in Rule 4 (k) (2).  Applying the plain 
language of Rule 4 (k)(2) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure it 
could be sufficient just to analyze the nature of the claim as a 
 
broader long-arm statutes. 
104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (k)(2) (adopted in 1993). 
105. See id. 
106. See STEVAN BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
(1997), 105, quoting Omni Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 
111, where the defendant had sufficient contacts to satisfy due process concerns, but in-
sufficient contacts to fall within any State long-arm statute; see also Eskofot A/S v. E.I. 
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), where the court also 
held that sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole establishes federal jurisdic-
tion. 
107. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (a) (West Supp. 1999) Section 301 provides that “all legal 
or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general 
scope of copyright as specified in section 106 . . . are governed exclusively by this title.  
Thereafter [January 1, 1978], no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in 
any such work under the common law or statutes of any state.” Id. 
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copyright claim and the lacking application of state’s long-arm 
statutes.  Consequently, it would be easy to verify minimum con-
tacts and fairness factors based on the pure invitation to access a 
Web site in the United States.  Its potential accessibility in the 
United States then would rationalize the finding of “sufficient con-
tacts with the United States as a whole”.108 
However, case law seems to point in a different direction.  In 
Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.109 a New York dis-
trict court applied Rule 4 (k)(2) of the Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure and held that “personal jurisdiction may be asserted by courts 
where a foreign corporation, through an act performed elsewhere, 
causes an effect in the United States.”110  It is needless to say that 
the mere act of providing the link between the two Web sites and 
storing this link in Germany on a German ISP does not cause an 
effect in the United States at all as long as no end user in the 
United States calls on the link.  Consequently it appears to be im-
possible to establish international personal jurisdiction in the con-
text of framing activities just by virtue of the framing Web site be-
ing accessible over the Internet.  For that reason it is clear that the 
framing Web site actually needs to be hit by American end users. 
Apparently, without a hit there would be no effect at all. 
Hitting the Web site causes an effect in the sense that it creates 
copies in the end user’s RAM, the Web site becomes visible on the 
end user’s computer screen, and the Web site is also potentially 
subject for a long term storage in the computer’s hard drive.  At a 
first glance, however, it seems to be inappropriate to take just one 
hit in the United States to establish minimum contacts by virtue of 
having “an effect” in the United States.  Even though it is very 
much likely that it is foreseeable for the German content provider 
and her ISP that the link will be, once it is posted on the Internet, 
accessed anywhere in the world,111 fairness factors, derived from 
 
108. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of Unemployment 
Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945). 
109. Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995).  The plaintiff, a Danish corporation, claimed anticompetitive acts in Europe con-
ducted by an United States corporation barring entry into the United States market. See 
id.; see also United States v. Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters, 945 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
110. See Eskofot, 872 F. Supp. at 87. 
111. See Ginsburg, Copyright without Borders, supra note 81, at 160 (making that 
BURMEISTER.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:37 PM 
654 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 9:625 
the due process clause, appear as to render personal international 
jurisdiction for “just one hit” unconstitutional.112  On the one side, 
the public interest in the United States to prosecute a “one hit” 
claim seems to be invisibly small because, at the first glance, only 
minimal impact can be found.  Moreover, it seems to be too much 
of a burden for a defendant to come to the United States to defend 
a case just because the defendant’s Web site has been hit there 
once. 
However, there is different impact to be found depending on 
what the end user actually does with the information she down-
loaded.  Obviously, the impact will be heavy in case the end user 
not only downloads the information into the computer’s RAM but 
makes copies of it by saving the downloaded information on her 
hard drive.  The copy from the hard drive might be easily dissemi-
nated to third parties thereby threatening the author’s rights exten-
sively.  Under this circumstances, public interest to prosecute a one 
 
argument with respect to foreseeability.) 
112. However, Germany’s procedural and substantive policies would not necessar-
ily contradict the prosecution of a “one hit” claim. Germany was very strict in its demand 
to shut down a Web site hosted by CompuServe and which was communicating third 
party’s child pornography materials.  CompuServe, in order to comply with German law, 
had to take the Web sites off the Internet entirely thereby denying access to not only 
German subscribers but American subscribers as well.  With respect to German law, sec-
tion 184 (3) of the German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) renders dissemination, 
performance and production of pornographic material depicting violence, sexual abuse of 
children and sexual conduct with animals as a crime.  This provision is, pursuant to sec-
tion 6 (6) of the German Penal Code, also applicable to international crimes of non-
nationals committed abroad.  This ‘long-arm’ provision, however, might extend the scope 
of a country’s jurisdiction to adjudicate, see German Federal Supreme Court, BGH StR 
1976, 298.  Nevertheless, as Stephan Wilske and Teresa Schiller point out, Germany is in 
accordance with international law when it makes its nationals even abroad subject to its 
prohibition of dissemination of child pornography. See Wilske & Schiller, supra note 45, 
at 132.  Consequently, Munich’s lower district court, AG München, Urt. vom 28.5.1998, 
CR 1998, 500 convicted CompuServe Germany’s CEO for CompuServe USA hosting 
pornographic content provided by third parties. However, there is a strong indication that 
the court disregarded section 5 of the German Teleservice Act providing the conditions 
under which an ISP is exempted from liability for hosting third party content.  The trial 
court particularly neglected to take into consideration that CompuServe USA offers its 
service to approximately five million customers in 185 countries and that it was, at least 
during the relevant time, technically impossible for CompuServe USA to block German 
customers from access to the content only, see Hans-Werner Moritz, CompuServe Ger-
many’s trial lawyer, in his annotation to the verdict, in: COMPUTER UND RECHT 505, 508 
(1998).  The case is on appeal.  A decision is expected later in 1999. 
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a one hit claim is certainly substantial. Given that the defendants 
know about information on the Internet being ubiquitously avail-
able and the possibility that downloaded information can be saved 
on the hard disk, it does not seem to be too much of a burden for 
the German defendants to come the United States to defend a 
claim.  In this respect it is relevant what the court in Maritz held 
namely that “[b]y simply setting up, and posting information at, a 
Web site in the form of an advertisement or solicitation, one has 
done everything necessary to reach the global Internet audi-
ence.”113  But the outcome of the analysis changes when the end 
user does nothing more than just downloads the information into 
the computer’s RAM without intent to permanently save it.  The 
impact on the copyright owner’s reproduction right is compara-
tively small and the threat to violate the author’s reproduction right 
is consequently smaller too.  To counterbalance the small impact 
the download into the computer’s RAM has, it is reasonable to 
demand a sufficiently large number of hits.  A sufficiently large 
number114 of hits makes up the lack of a heavily weighing impact 
on the author’s reproduction right due to permanent storage in the 
computer’s hard drive.115 
Consequently, after all, purposeful availment in the context of 
framing can be established as follows: First, when the information 
was downloaded into the computer’s RAM for a sufficiently large 
number of times in the United States as a whole.  Second, when the 
information was downloaded into the computer’s RAM and stored 
on the computer’s hard drive once. 
With regard to the hypothetical it is assumed that the German 
framer’s Web site was visited in the United States by a sufficient 
large number of end users.116 As a consequence, the framer and her 
 
113. Maritz, Inc., v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
114. This number has yet to be determined. 50 hits seem to be sufficient to make up 
the threat to author’s rights imposed by saving downloaded content on the computer’s 
hard drive. 
115. See Ginsburg, Copyright without Borders, supra note 81, at 161 (focusing on a 
sufficiently large number of hits to satisfy minimum contacts.)  However, Prof. Ginsburg 
does not explicitly distinguish between information downloaded into the computer’s 
RAM and information stored in the computer’s hard drive. See id. 
116. It appears to be more difficult to prove that an end user actually saved down-
loaded content to her hard disk than establishing a sufficiently large number of hits. 
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ISP purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of the United 
States as a whole.  Therefore, international personal jurisdiction 
over the German defendants has been established. 
(d) Forum Non Conveniens 
The German defendants still could invoke the forum of non 
convenience doctrine.  The term “forum non conveniens” refers to 
court’s discretionary power to decline jurisdiction when conven-
ience of parties and ends of justice would be better served if the 
suit would be brought in a different forum.117  In determining 
whether the doctrine of non convenience ought to be applied, the 
court should consider a number of relevant factors: (1) the relative 
ease of access to sources of proof, (2) availability of compulsory 
process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, (3) cost of obtaining 
attendance of willing witnesses, (4) possibility of view of prem-
ises, and (5) all other practical problems that make a trial easy, ex-
peditious and inexpensive.118 
It does not seem to be the case that framing a Web page opens 
court’s discretionary power to decline jurisdiction.  The sources of 
proof are accessible over the Internet and witnesses are most likely 
not needed, a fact that renders the availability of compulsory proc-
ess for attendance of unwilling witnesses and cost of obtaining at-
tendance of willing witnesses irrelevant.  There are also no prem-
ises to be viewed, except, perhaps, the framing Web site at issue 
which can be accessed through the Internet anywhere.  The fact 
that the defendants have to travel from Germany to the United 
States forum and the fact as such that they have to defend them-
selves before a foreign court might cause some remaining incon-
venience.  However, considering the world wide accessibility of 
the Internet, about which the defendants presumably were aware of 
and which they most likely appreciated, it is reasonable not to 
permit them the right to invoke the doctrine of the forum of non 
conveniens. 
 
117. See Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997, 1000 (Wash.  1976) en 
banc; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1994). 
118. See Di Lella v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 7 F.R.D. 192, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 
1947). 
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3. Intermediate Result 
As an intermediate result it can be concluded that federal courts 
can exercise international personal jurisdiction in the context of 
framing when the framing Web site is sufficiently interactive and 
two alternative conditions are met: First, the Web site has been hit 
once in case the downloaded information was permanently saved 
on the computer’s hard disk; or second, the Web site has been hit 
sufficiently often in case the downloaded information was only 
temporary stored in the computer’s RAM.  Furthermore, defen-
dants are not able to invoke the doctrine of forum of non conven-
iens. 
B. Choice of Law 
After international personal jurisdiction over the German de-
fendants has been established by virtue of finding sufficient Web 
site hits in the whole United States the question arises whether it is 
German or United States copyright law that governs the case. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides no guidelines as to the 
conflicts of law and neither does the national treatment principle of 
the Berne Convention.119  The latter basically provides that a for-
eign author seeking copyright protection abroad has to be treated 
like a national.120  The fact pattern here is different since it is a 
domestic author seeking protection in his home jurisdiction against 
a foreign infringer.  For that reason determining the applicable law 
invokes the general principle of territoriality which traditionally 
governs the conflicts of law within internationally situated copy-
right cases.121 
 
119. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, completed 
at Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 
1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3. 
[hereinafter Berne Convention].  The United States joined in 1989 with the Berne Con-
vention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
120. See Berne Convention art. 5 (1), which provides: “Authors shall enjoy . . . in 
countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective 
laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals . . .”. 
121. See Andreas P. Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on 
Global Networks, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 799, 803 (1998). 
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1. The Shortcomings of the Territoriality Principle in the 
Digital Arena 
In the context of copyright cases within an international setting 
the principle of territoriality is traditionally of some importance.  It 
describes the fact that national copyright law is applicable only 
within the country; that it does not reach across its borders.122  The 
mirror like counterpart to the principle of territoriality is the prin-
ciple of the country of protection (lex loci protectionis) stating that 
the origination and the scope of copyright protection is determined 
by the law of the country in which copyright protection is actually 
being sought. This principle is set forth in Article 5 (2) of the 
Berne Convention.123  Following the principle of territoriality and 
its mirror-like counterpart the applicable law in copyright cases 
within an international context is generally the law of that country 
in which the infringing acts occurred.124 Applying those principles, 
for example, in a case where somebody legally acquires an original 
work of authorship in Germany, brings it to the United States, cop-
ies it and sells it publicly in the United States, it is without any 
doubt that United States copyright law applies to solve the case. 
However, the Internet’s digital environment generally imposes 
a problem on the traditional territorial choice of law regime, be-
 
122. See id. at 804; also Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights 
in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 548 (1997). However, Berne, at least, 
does provide minimum protection for member state authors seeking copyright protection 
abroad in a country which is a member of Berne.  Minimum protection is granted for any 
kind of works of literature and art (Art. 2 of the Berne Convention).  The scope of the 
minimum protection is set forth in Art. 6bis of the Berne Convention and covers, inter alia, 
the rights to prepare translations, adaptations, reproductions, and the right to broadcast. 
123. Article 5 (2) of the Berne Convention provides that copyright protection “shall 
be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed”. Berne 
Convention, supra note 119, art. 5 (2). 
124. See, e.g., Murray, v. British Broadcasting Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 
1996) (holding that national treatment is “a choice of law rule mandating that the appli-
cable law be the copyright law of the country in which the infringement occurred”).  See 
also PAUL E. GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 3 [1][a] (1997); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 17.05 (1998) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].  
A minority of other legal commentators, however, interpret the language of Art 5 (2) of 
the Berne Convention “protection is claimed” literally and maintain the argument that the 
copyright law of that country applies in which the actual litigation takes place (lex fori 
rule), see, e.g. Ginsburg, Global Use, supra note 2, at 336-37. 
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cause a single use of a copyrighted work might lead to effects in a 
number of different countries.  A content provider might upload a 
work on the Internet in one country which is then accessed by an 
end user who downloads it into her RAM of her computer in a dif-
ferent country.  Applying a strictly territorial choice of law regime, 
one is unable to define which copyright laws exclusive rights may 
have been infringed because neither the content provider can con-
trol who in fact accesses the work she uploaded nor is the end user 
able to identify the location of the source of the work she browsed 
and then downloaded.125 
A plausible approach to decide whether it is the broadcasting or 
the receiving country’s law that ought to govern the conflict could 
be the determination as to whether it is the receiving or the broad-
casting activity which in fact weighs heavier as a cause to the in-
fringing act. With regard to framing, where the infringing act al-
legedly is the creation of a copy in the end users RAM of her 
computer, neither of the two conducts - sending and receiving—
seem to outweigh the other in terms of importance. Both are logi-
cally necessary for the creation of the copy in the computer’s 
RAM; without one of the two causes no infringement would occur.  
Moreover and generally in the context of the Internet, both alterna-
tives come along with disadvantages which are surely not wanted.  
Applying the receiving country’s law a content provider would ex-
pose herself to as many foreign copyright laws as there are coun-
tries with Internet access.126 Assuming the content provider is ea-
ger to avoid becoming subject to suit in one of the Internet 
countries, she would be forced to consider all the country’s copy-
right laws and to curtail her content to bring it in accordance with 
those laws.  Proceedings like this would take too much trouble and 
would be insecure too.  The other alternative, applying the law of 
the broadcasting country, has been initially proposed by the Com-
 
125. See Reindl, supra note 121, at 807-8; Ginsburg, Copyright without Borders, 
supra 81, at 318-20; David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of 
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1371. (1996) (“[t]he system is indifferent to 
the physical location of [machines between which messages and information are routed], 
and there is no necessary connection between an Internet address and a physical jurisdic-
tion”). 
126. See Johnson & Post, supra note 125, at 1374; Ginsburg, Global Use, supra 
note 2, at 334; Fraser, supra note 2, at 765. 
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mission of the European Union.127  Its proposal was based on the 
approach chosen by the EU’s Satellite Broadcasting Council Direc-
tive128 which applies the broadcasting country theory.  Particularly 
Article 1 (2)(b) of the directive provides in that respect that the au-
thoritative country for acquiring broadcasting rights is the country 
from where the broadcast is being conducted.  Without questioning 
the plausibility of the broadcasting country theory in the context of 
satellite broadcasting,129 in the context of the Internet serious prob-
lems would come along with it.  Content providers could avoid li-
ability by using ISP from a country which affords its nationals a 
comparatively lesser standard in copyright protection than the con-
tent provider’s home country does.130 The current system of inter-
national copyright protection would be rendered useless with re-
gard to digital communication and exchange of information over 
the Internet.131 
However, it is necessary to find an approach that reasonably 
enables the legal system to properly solve the choice of law ques-
tion and to reach justifiable solutions in the context of the Internet. 
 
127. See Commission of the European Communities, Copyright and Related Rights 
in the Information Society: Green Paper presented by the Commission, COM (95) 382 
Final (July 1995) [hereinafter Green Paper]. 
128. See Official Gazette of the EU No. L 248/15 (Oct. 6, 1993). 
129. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. General 
Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381 (9th Cir. 1995) ruled the opposite way holding that the 
transmission of a copyrighted work from the United States into Canada was not copyright 
infringement even though the broadcasts originated in the United States. 
130. See Reindl, supra note 121, at 836. In June 1997, for example, the pacific is-
land Tonga advertised its ISP to potential customers by emphasizing that the country 
does not have a trademark law, thus trademark infringement would be impossible, see 
German commentator Stefan Bechtold, Multimedia und Urheberrecht - einige grund-
sätzliche Anmerkungen, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT (GRUR), 
18, 23 n.60 (1998). 
131. This has been recognized also by the European Union’s Commission which, 
after hefty criticism abandoned the idea in its ‘Follow up’ to the Greenpaper on Copy-
right, COM (96) 568 Final. See German commentators Axel Nordemann /Heinz God-
dar/Marion Tönhard/Christian Czychowski, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheber-
recht im Internet, COMPUTER UND RECHT (CR), 645, 652 (1996); see also Reindl, supra 
note 121, at 831-36 (identifying arguments in favor of the application of the law of the 
country of origin but concluding that the “arguments against applying such a choice of 
law rule are more persuasive”). 
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2. Alternative Approaches in the Digital Arena 
Available alternative approaches can be divided into two cate-
gories.  The first category relies heavily on a traditionally known 
method usually employed in tort cases within an international set-
ting.  The second approach reflects on a new and distinctive cyber-
law. 
a. The Victim Approach as a Solution 
It is impossible to make a preference in favor of either the re-
ceiving country or the broadcasting country.132  Therefore, it may 
be useful to redirect one’s focus from the perpetration of the in-
fringement to the infringement itself, particularly to the author of 
the infringed original work.  Thus, the focus is directed to the place 
where the victim of the infringing conduct is situated.  This ap-
proach seems to be well established in the context of torts commit-
ted in an international setting. 
A tort is defined as “a violation of a duty imposed by general 
law or otherwise upon all persons occupying the relation to each 
other that is involved in a transaction”.133  Copyright law as such 
imposes a duty on third parties, namely not to violate the author’s 
exclusive rights set forth in the Copyright Act.  As a consequence, 
copyright infringement certainly constitutes a tort.134 It should be, 
therefore, legitimate to analyze the law concerning international 
torts and to apply an analogous approach to copyright infringement 
on the Internet. 
There are two underlying theories leading to a determination 
 
132. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
133. Coleman v. California Yearly Meeting of Friends Church, 27 Cal. App. 2d. 
579, 581 (1938); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6 (1965).  Section 6 de-
fines tortious conduct as conduct that “denote[s] the fact that conduct whether of act or 
omission is of such a character as to subject the actor to liability under the principles of 
the law of Torts”. Id. 
134. Section 823 (1) of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) 
creates the equivalent tort provision in German law providing liability in case of an un-
lawful conduct causing damage.  Section 823 (2) of the German Civil Code imposes the 
same liability on those who violate specific protective law (‘Schutzgesetz’).  The German 
copyright act doubtlessly qualifies as such a protective law, see Palandt, Bürgerliches Ge-
setzbuch, Kommentar, 58th ed., § 823 margin number 151. 
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which law should apply when a tort is committed in an interna-
tional setting.  The first theory with respect to international torts is 
the traditional one that is based on the “lex loci delicti” approach.  
According to the lex loci delicti rule the applicable law is the law 
of the place where the tort has been committed.  Thus, decisive is 
the place where the last event occurred which was necessary to 
make an actor liable.135 However, while this rule seems to be an 
adequate one in the real word it is not in cyberspace.  In cyber-
space it is difficult to identify where on the Internet events actually 
occur.  The location might be any country that is on-line.  There-
fore, the lex loci delicti approach turns out to be inappropriate to 
serve as a sound choice of law regime in cyberspace.136  The sec-
ond theory determines the applicable law by finding out the most 
significant relationship the participating parties have to a particular 
country.137  It deserves further inquiry as to the question whether it 
provides a feasible basis for the choice of law decision. 
(1) The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws 
To determine the most significant relationship the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts of Laws provides in section 6 (2) that in case 
there is no statutory directive concerning the choice of law the fac-
tors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the 
relative interests of those states in the determination of the 
particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
 
135. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 377 (1937). 
136. See Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transna-
tional Cyberspace, VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 93 (1996). 
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971). 
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(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to 
be applied.138 
Section 145 (2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of 
Laws furthermore provides what kind of contacts are to be taken 
into account when applying the principles of section 6.139  Those 
contacts include: 
(a) the place where the injury occurred, 
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, 
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties, and 
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the 
parties is centered.140 
Section 145 (2) (a) and (b) of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flicts of Law basically resemble the traditional rule of the lex loci 
delicti: when the place where the injury occurred and the place 
where the conduct causing the injury occurred is identical it fol-
lows naturally that the law of this particular place ought to be ap-
plicable.141  But it becomes more difficult to determine the appli-
cable law when the place of injury and the place of cause are 
different from each other. 
(2) Place of Injury v. Place of Cause 
The difficulty in determining the applicable when the place of 
cause and place of injury are different can be illustrated by the fol-
lowing example:  an American tourist buys a poisoned apple in 
Rome, carries it back home to Texas,142 eats it and becomes sick.  
The injury clearly occurs in Texas whereas the cause was set in 
Rome invoking the question whether Texas law ought to apply or 
 
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145. 
140. Section 145 of the Restatement of Law has been criticized for not providing a 
rule in its true sense since it lacks a definition of the word “significant”, see Juenger, 
Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 212 (1969). 
141. See id. 
142. Leaving the fact aside that United States law prohibits the importation of agri-
cultural products of any kind. 
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Italian law.  Logically, there are two approaches leading to a solu-
tion of this conflict.  The judge might either choose between the 
place of injury and the place of cause or she might combine both 
places, choosing the law alternatively.  In fact there seems to be no 
greater justification for choosing either the place of injury or the 
place of the cause to determine the applicable law.  The former 
protects the valid confidence of the victim in her particular envi-
ronment and the latter protects the actor who might have acted in 
accordance with the law applicable at her environment.  Section 
145 (2) (a) and (b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts actually 
does not provide any help in that respect since both place of injury 
and place of cause seem to weigh equally without favoring one or 
the other as being the decisive contact. 
However, considering section 6 (2) of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflicts of Law, it appears to be the fact that all the factors 
relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law point to one di-
rection which is to always protect the victim of a tortious act, re-
spectively to apply the law which favors the victim’s claim in gen-
eral.  It is without any doubt that, as a matter of policy, justified 
expectations, and predictability, it is usually the victim who should 
be protected.  The victim usually has no means to protect itself or 
to avoid the harmful event whereas the actor at least to a certain 
extent is able to control her actions and to consider future effects 
caused by her anticipated conduct.  That makes it reasonable to ap-
ply the law of the victim’s forum and to put the burden on the actor 
even though her conduct might be legal at her home country.143 
Considering fairness standards toward the defendant it seems to 
be necessary to employ a foreseeability test with regard to the 
question whether a content provider could reasonably foresee that 
 
143. See Reindl, supra note 121, at 836-53 (presenting a slightly different solution).  
He essentially relies on the economic effects a transmission might have at a given terri-
tory. See id. at 837.  However, following Reindl’s approach, a number of online transmis-
sions will have economic effects in a number of receiving countries leading, conse-
quently, to the potential application of a number of different copyright laws.  Therefore, 
Reindl’s suggestion does not seem to sufficiently solve the main concern emerging from 
the principle of territoriality in the context of the Internet that is the unlimited number of 
different applicable copyright laws.  The victim approach on the other hand necessarily 
leads to the application of the country’s copyright law where the defendant is situated. 
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her work will be accessed in a particular country.144 In the context 
of the Internet, however, the use of the medium as such strongly 
implies foreseeability in this respect. A content provider is cer-
tainly aware of the fact that a work, once uploaded, is ubiquitously 
available in every country that has access to the Internet.  Given 
this awareness, it must be concluded that it is the content pro-
vider’s intent to actually make her work ubiquitously available. As 
a consequence, she can, respectively does, reasonably foresee that 
her work will be accessed anywhere. Particularly in case the con-
tent provider derives her revenue from operating a Web site either 
by granting access to it for a fee or by publishing third party adver-
tising for a fee the content provider foresees the accessibility. In 
both cases the content provider depends on as much access as pos-
sible regardless from which country the access originates.145 
However plausible an approach based on traditional rules with 
regard to the shortcoming of the principle of territoriality is, apply-
ing those rules for resolving conflicts of law problems in cyber-
space is subject to fundamental criticism. This fundamental criti-
cism finds its expression particularly in the proposal of a 
distinctive cyberlaw. 
 
144. Id. at 844-45.  It is suggested, thereby pointing to case law stating “that an 
element of potential knowledge or perhaps even intent must exist before foreign copy-
right laws are applied to ensure fairness toward the defendant.” Id. at 844.  The foresee-
ability test is applicable in international product liability cases limiting a defendant’s risk 
to become subject to foreign product liability claims, see Russel Weintraub, Methods for 
Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 
148 (1989); Hague Conference on Private International Law: Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Products Liability, Oct. 12, 1972, art. 7, 11 I.L.M. 1283 (providing that the 
place of injury or the plaintiff’s residence is inapplicable if the manufacturer could not 
reasonably foresee that the injury causing product would be available in those places 
through ordinary commerce). 
145. See Reindl, supra note 121, at 849, who suggests that the foreseeability test 
will be easily met where a content provider receives revenues from online customers. 
However, the test, he seem to suggest, is not necessarily met in cases where content pro-
viders provide free and uncontrolled access to their Web sites deriving revenues, for ex-
ample, from third party advertising. Id. at 850. 
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b. Distinctive Cyberlaw 
David R. Johnson and David Post have proposed a new dimen-
sion with regard to the applicable law in cyberspace.  Their pro-
posal is meant to overcome the traditional approaches for deter-
mining jurisdiction and choice of law.146  They analyze that the 
traditional methods have their justifying basis in the real physical 
world where control over physical space, and people and things lo-
cated there is a defining attribute of sovereignty and statehood.  
There is a correspondence between physical boundaries and juris-
dictional boundaries which reflects a strong relationship between 
physical proximity and the effects of any particular behavior.147  
Cyberspace, say Johnson and Post, has no territorially based 
boundaries anymore and physical locations almost entirely lack the 
power to control activity in Cyberspace.148  Moreover, the effects 
of on-line activity in cyberspace are not tied to geographically 
proximate locations either.149  Thus, traditional principles are not 
able to function as proper guidelines in the virtual world because 
cyberspace without any doubt “undermines the relationship be-
tween legally significant (on-line) phenomena and physical loca-
tion.”150 
The proposed alternative would be to recognize cyberspace as 
a distinct place with its own (electronic) boundaries.151  When tak-
ing cyberspace as its own distinct place one could overcome the 
difficulties determined by a regime of inconsistent copyright laws 
 
146. See Johnson & David, supra note 125, at 1374. 
147. See id. at 1369. 
148. See id. at 1370-71. 
149. See id. at 1375; see also German commentator Stefan Bechtold, Multimedia 
und Urheberrecht - einige grundsätzliche Anmerkungen, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ 
UND URHEBERRECHT (GRUR) 1998, 18, 23. 
150. Johnson & Post, supra note 125, at 1370; see also Burnstein supra note 136, at 
93-4; Axel Nordemann /Heinz Goddar/Marion Tönhard/Christian Czychowski, Gewer-
blicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Internet, COMPUTER UND RECHT (CR) 645, 651 
(1996). 
151. This idea also finds proponents among German legal commentators, who ex-
plicitly recognizes that copyright infringement is not connected to a particular country 
anymore but occurs within a communication network.  See Stefan Bechtold, Multimedia 
und Urheberrecht - einige grundsätzliche Anmerkungen, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ 
UND URHEBERRECHT (GRUR) 18, 23 (1998). 
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following the principle of territoriality.152  Inconsistent copyright 
laws could be replaced by new doctrines particularly tailored to 
cyberspace.153  Already in the real world much creative expression 
is entirely independent of an incentive structure and has more to do 
with building up recognition in the community and the accumula-
tion of reputational capital.154  Moreover, seeing cyberspace as a 
place with its own boundaries would facilitate the development of 
new doctrines of implied license and fair use with regard to the 
transmissions and creations of copies incidentally caused when 
browsing and caching the Internet.  Based on its own cross-
boundary “spaceness” cyberspace could also provide means to re-
solve disputes which might occur within its boundaries based on 
the countries willingness to delegate authority and sovereignty to a 
self governing cyberspace body.155 
3. Determining the Applicable Law 
It is obvious that distinctive cyberlaw does not yet exist.  There 
might be some efforts around like the adoption of netiquette156 pro-
viding core rules with respect to the style people on the Internet 
communicate with each other.157  Moreover, an on-line mediation 
and arbitration center for domain name disputes under the roof of 
the WIPO can be found as well.158  But it is needless to say that 
those efforts, even though they might point into the right direction, 
 
152. See Johnson & Post supra note 125, at 1383. 
153. See id. at 1384. 
154. This may be even more true in cyberspace where it is already happening that 
copyright holders, like Netscape and Microsoft with respect to their Internet browser 
software, first give away their work for free in order to create a reputational capital which 
can be financially exploited later. 
155. See Johnson & Post, supra note 125, at 1391. 
156. “Netiquette” describes a voluntarily administered set of rules about how to  
behave when connected to the Internet: “[T]he informal rules and customs that have de-
veloped on the Internet.”  Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communica-
tion Service, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  Despite its character as 
purely voluntary, litigators try to use netiquette rules to argue their cases, see id. at 1375.  
An introduction to the rules is available on Netiquette Homepage, (visited July 26, 1998) 
<http://www.etiquette.net/index.html>. 
157. See Johnson & Post, supra note 125, at 1389. 
158. Initiated by the International Ad Hoc Committee, see Annette Kur, Der Bericht 
des International Ad Hoc Committee, COMPUTER UND RECHT (CR) 325, 327 (1997); see 
also  Johnson & Post, supra note 125, at 1388. 
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do not make up a distinctive cyberlaw solving actual problems in 
determining “real” jurisdiction and choice of law issues in Internet 
related copyright cases with international participation.  It seems to 
be very likely that the only promising way to create a truly effec-
tive cyberlaw will be the administration of multilateral treaties 
such as TRIPs or the WIPO administered Berne Convention and 
the Copyright Treaty from December 20, 1996.159  The latter at 
least partially deals with Internet related aspects of technology, al-
though not as to jurisdiction and choice of law issues,160 and TRIPs 
which brings Berne’s minimum standards of IP protection into the 
WTO regime of trade liberalization and, for the first time in the 
history of multilateral IP treaties, provides an enforcement proce-
dure to its provisions.161  The multilateral copyright treaties could 
serve as a basis for coordination of the multitude of interests of the 
parties connected to the net, thereby considering the different cul-
tures, legal standards and values of the participating parties.162  
Even though it will be extremely difficult to internationalize copy-
right with regard to distinct cyberlaw,163 maintaining the idea of a 
distinctive cyberplace with its own boundaries will, at the same 
 
159. See Stefan Bechtold, Multimedia und Urheberrecht - einige grundsätzliche 
Anmerkungen, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT (GRUR) 18, 23 
(1998). This German commentator particularly points out this fact. 
160. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, adopted by Dip-
lomatic Conference at Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO 
Copyright Treaty]. Article 8 provides: “[a]uthors of literary and artistic work shall enjoy 
the exclusive right of authorization any communication to the public of their works, by 
wire, or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in 
such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.” See id.  As of 1998, the treaty has been signed by fifty-one 
states and is ratified by three, namely Belarus, Indonesia and the Republic of Moldovia, 
see World Intellectual Property Organization, (visited July 26, 1998) 
<http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/s-copy.htm>. 
161. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of 
the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L 
LAW 275 (1997) (analyzing the enforcement mechanism provided by TRIPs). 
162. See Johnson & Post, supra note 125, at 1395 (categorizing this variety of con-
cerns as “internal diversity”).  The commentators propose that this internal diversity be-
comes exercised and secured by contractual provision which are imposed by different 
local sysops on the cyberlaw citizens. See id. at 1397. 
163. See Stefan Bechtold, Multimedia und Urheberrecht-einige grundsätzliche An-
merkungen, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT (GRUR) 1998, 18, 23 
(articulating this concern). 
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time, also facilitate the necessary process of identification and ad-
dressing pertinent problems to eventually create a smoothly work-
ing system. 
The lack of distinctive cyberlaw on the one side and the neces-
sity to provide “justice” in a truly existing conflict between parties 
with conflicting interests consequently leads to the conclusion that 
traditional choice of law concepts ought to be applied.  Following 
the analogy of tort principles in an international copyright dispute, 
discussed earlier, it appears to be quite easy to determine the appli-
cability of United States copyright law.  The victim, the author of 
the framed Web site, resides in the United States and the victim in 
an international tort case deserves protection.  Because distinctive 
cyberlaw is lacking and the principle of territoriality looking for 
the place where the conduct causing the infringement took place 
does not provide a decisive help either, the traditional victim ap-
proach should be analogously applied in international copyright 
cases in the context of the Internet.  Since, with regard to the hypo-
thetical, the victim is a United States resident the United States 
Copyright Act of 1976 ought to be ruling the case.164 
C. Intermediate Result 
As an intermediate result it can be concluded, with regard to 
the hypothetical, that United States federal courts can exercise per-
sonal international jurisdiction over the German defendants be-
cause minimum contacts to the United States as a whole can be es-
tablished. Furthermore, United States copyright law governs the 
case because the victim of the allegedly infringing act is a United 
States resident. The traditionally in international copyright cases 
used choice of law rules, which are based on the principle of terri-
toriality, do not apply. 
 
164. The victim approach is consistent with German international private law con-
cerning tort cases which applies the law of the place of injury and the law of the place of 
cause alternatively in favor of the victim of a tortious act.  See GERHARD KEGEL, 
INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT 533-37 (7th ed. 1995).  The commentator explicitly ar-
gues that ‘the sympathy with the victim is generally greater than the sympathy with the 
actor’. See id.  However, it needs to be emphasized that German conflict of law doctrine, 
in case there are two places of perpetration, favors the law which is more favorable for 
the defendant, that might very well be the victim’s or the delinquent’s law. See id. at 541. 
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III. IS FRAMING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT UNDER UNITED  
STATES LAW? 
The determination whether framing is copyright infringement 
particularly points to the question whether the work of authorship 
being framed is protected by copyright law.  In case it does not, no 
copyright infringement occurs and a framer cannot be held liable in 
the first place.  Analyzing whether a work being framed is copy-
right protected invokes the question as to the requirements of copy-
right protection in general.  These questions entail what the subject 
matter of copyright protection is and in case the framed work falls 
within subject matter of copyright law, whether the act of framing 
infringes one of the author’s exclusive rights. 
A. The Subject Matter of Copyright 
The subject matter of copyright is defined by section 102 of the 
Copyright Act of 1976.165  According to section 102 (a) works of 
authorship include in particular literary, musical, pictorial, and 
audiovisual works as well as sound recordings.166  Section 102 (a) 
furthermore prescribes that copyright protection subsist only “in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or oth-
erwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a ma-
chine.”167 
The language of the statute invokes two questions.  The first 
question refers to the standard of “originality” a work of authorship 
needs to have to qualify for copyright protection.  The second 
question emerges from the significant characteristics of the Internet 
and refers to the problem whether original works of authorship 
transferred over the Internet are fixed in a tangible medium pursu-
ant to the language of the statute. 
 
165. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1010 (West Supp.1999)) [hereinafter Copyright Act]. 
166. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (a) (West Supp. 1999). Dramatic, choreographic and archi-
tectural works are protected as well but play apparently a little role in the context of the 
Internet and the conduct of framing. 
167. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (a). 
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1. The Standard of Originality 
The term originality refers basically to the fact that an original 
work of authorship does not have to be novel but rather independ-
ently created and not copied from other works.168  But it is not just 
the independent creation of a work in itself that confers copy-
rightability.  Copyrightability can be claimed only in the expres-
sion of the work of authorship and not in its underlying ideas.169  
This aspect of the standard of originality is usually referred to as 
the idea/expression dichotomy.  Furthermore, the work has to re-
flect a minimum degree of creativity. 
a. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
The idea/expression dichotomy points out that underlying ideas 
of a work can not be copyright protected at all.  Following the 
copyright clause of the constitution,170 which provides that copy-
rights might be granted to promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts, it is impossible to grant a copyright for an idea since it 
would confer a monopoly to the author and thereby inhibiting the 
promotion of science and the useful arts. 
 
168. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 124, § 2.01 [A]. 
169. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). 
170. See U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 8 “The Congress shall have the power . . .  To 
promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, By Securing for Limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the Exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
Id.  The constitutional copyright clause reveals in particular that American copyright pro-
tection is not, unlike copyright protection in European countries such as Germany and 
France, based upon any natural rights an author retains in his works.  Rather that copy-
right is a purely statutory right serving the welfare of the public by giving authors an in-
centive to produce original works of authorship which in turn enhances the promotion of 
science and useful arts.  See H.R. NO. 2222, 60th Cong. (1908).  For a critical and concise 
discussion of the concept of romantic authorships opposed to the economic analysis pre-
vailing in anglo-american copyright law see Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and 
the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Romantic Au-
thorship] (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY).  Professor Lemley argues that the idea of 
romantic authorship suffers from three deficiencies.  First, it is unable to explain the legal 
rules that make up intellectual property law, second, a number of intellectual property 
areas are inconsistent with the idea of romantic authorship and third, the idea of romantic 
authorship cannot explain the changes taking place in intellectual property law today. See 
Lemley, Romantic Authorship, supra at 879. 
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The idea/expression dichotomy found early application in 
Baker v. Selden.171  There, Selden was the author of a book that de-
scribed a new way of accounting.  He developed an account book 
ledger design that incorporated his new idea.  Baker copied the ac-
count book ledger and Selden sued him for copyright infringe-
ment.172  The court held that Selden’s book was subject of copy-
right protection but not the account book ledger because the latter 
itself just represents the idea which then found its expression in the 
detailed descriptions of the book. 173  In other words, Seldan 
teaches that the written expression is copyrightable, the idea - the 
account book ledger as such - has to remain unprotected to ensure 
that it cannot be monopolized by the person who “invented” the 
idea, thereby inhibiting the promotion of science and the useful 
arts.  However, in cases where the idea and its expression is in-
separable, “copying the expression will not be barred, since pro-
tecting the expression in such circumstances would confer a mo-
nopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner”.174  The non-
copyrightability of ideas and expressions being inseparable is 
commonly referred to as the merger doctrine. 
The idea/expression dichotomy was explicitly recognized in 
section 102 (b) which provides that “[i]n no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, princi-
ple, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”175  Denying 
copyright protection to any idea or process does not mean that a 
written description of the idea or process cannot enjoy copyright 
protection,176 unless, invoking the merger doctrine set forth in 
Baker v. Selden, the number of possible expression of the idea is 
 
171. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
172. See id. at 100. 
173. See id. at 104 (holding that “[t]he use of the art is a totally different thing from 
a publication of the book explaining it. The copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot 
secure the exclusive right to make, sell, and use account-books prepared upon the plan set 
forth in such book.”) 
174. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 
1971). 
175. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (b) (West Supp. 1999). 
176. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 124, § 2.03 [D]. 
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limited. 
b. The Creativity Requirement 
Traditionally, American courts granted copyright protection 
according to the “sweat of the brow” doctrine.177  Courts particu-
larly relied on section 5 (a) of the Copyright Act of 1909,178 pro-
vided categories under which a work might be copyrighted. One of 
these categories was “[b]ooks, including composite and cyclo-
paedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other compilations.”  
Section 5 (a) of the Copyright Act of 1909 was seen as a specifica-
tion as to the works “in which copyright can be claimed.”179  Ap-
plying the “sweat of the brow” doctrine courts conferred copyright 
protection already when plaintiff had expended some deal of labor 
regardless whether the work does contain some sense of creativity 
at all: 
The right to copyright a book upon which one has ex-
pended labor in its preparation does not depend upon 
whether the materials which he has collected consist or not 
of matters which are in publici juris, or whether such mate-
rial shows literary skill or originality . . . .  The man who 
goes through the streets of a town and puts down the names 
of each of the inhabitants, which their occupations and their 
street number, acquires material of which he is the au-
thor.180 
The Supreme Court overruled the “sweat of the brow” doctrine 
in 1991 in the Feist case.181  Rural, the plaintiff in Feist, was a tele-
phone company which distributed the yellow and the white pages 
listing of Rural’s subscribers in an alphabetical order together with 
 
177. See, e.g., Jeweler’s Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F 
83, (2d Cir. 1922) (holding that a compilation of trademarks of various firms is a direc-
tory and as such copyrightable).  See also Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 
F.2d 484 (9th Cir.) (holding that a telephone directory containing names, addresses, and 
phone numbers was copyrightable). 
178. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 9-12, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 
U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1010). 
179. See Jeweler’s Circular Publishing Co., 281 F. at, 85. 
180. Id. at 88. 
181. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
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gether with their towns and telephone numbers.  Feist, the defen-
dant, was a publishing company that specialized in areawide tele-
phone directories and its yellow pages covered also Rural’s service 
area.  Both parties competed vigorously with each other for adver-
tisement.  To compile the white pages Feist asked Rural to license 
its white page listing what Rural refused to do.182  As a result, Feist 
used the listings without Rural’s consent and incorporated them 
into its white pages.183  Rural sued for copyright infringement and 
the District Court, relying on caselaw, held that telephone directo-
ries are copyrightable.184 
The court acknowledges the copyrightability of compilations in 
general and refers to the idea/expression dichotomy and states that 
in absence of original written expression only the compiler’s selec-
tion and the arrangement may be protected and that raw facts may 
be freely copied.185  Holding facts as non-copyrightable, the court 
states, is in accordance with the Copyright Act of 1976, which 
provides in section 102 (b) that “copyright protection for an origi-
nal work of authorship [does not] extend to any idea.”186  Even 
though a compiler may use the selections and arrangements others 
have used as a starting point, thereby indicating, that novelty is not 
required, the court points out that the selection and arrangement of 
the facts has to be done independently and that the selection and 
arrangement needs to display some level of creativity.  As a result 
the court explicitly dismissed the sweat of the brow doctrine.187 
The opinion does not clearly define the threshold of creativity.  
However, the court ruled that names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers are merely non protectible facts and that Rural’s typical 
and obvious telephone listing—name, town, and telephone num-
ber—as well as the arrangement of the listings in alphabetical or-
der does not meet the minimum creativity requirement necessary to 
 
182. See id. at 343. 
183. See id. 
184. Id. at 344. 
185. See id. at 359 (holding “the facts contained in existing works may be freely 
copied because copyright protects only the elements that owe their origin to the com-
piler—the selection, coordination, and arrangement of facts”). 
186. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (b) (West Supp. 1999). 
187. See id. at 359-60. 
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confer copyright protection.188 
Consequently, framing a Web page does not constitute copy-
right infringement when the Web page lacks a minimum of creativ-
ity as required by the Feist case.  The determination of the original-
ity of a work of authorship, however, has to be made on a case by 
case basis.  Since it is just a spark of creativity which is needed to 
make a work eligible for copyrightability, it would be good advice 
to treat a doubtful case as copyrightable matter rather than non-
copyrightable. 
2. Fixation in a Tangible Medium 
The way that the Internet works and information is communi-
cated through the Internet heavily depends on storing information 
in the Computer’s memory devices, particularly the ISP’s and 
cache providers hard disk.189  Following the definition of the term 
‘fixation’ provided in section 101,  the storage of the information 
in those memory devices does qualify as fixation pursuant section 
102 (a).190  Section 101 states: “a work is fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression when its embodiment in a copy . . .  is suffi-
ciently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a 
transitory duration”.191  It appears to be rather settled law that 
original works of authorship, stored in the hard disk of a computer, 
are fixed pursuant section 106 (a), because it goes without saying 
that an original work of authorship, stored in the hard disk of a 
computer, is a stable copy of the original work which can, with the 
aid of a machine, be perceived for a period of more than a trans-
itory duration.192  Courts have long recognized that a ROM193 is a 
 
188. See id. at 362-3 (“Rural expended sufficient effort to make the white pages di-
rectory useful, but insufficient creativity to make it original.”). 
189. For the discussion whether RAM storage constitutes fixation see infra Part 
III.B.2.a. 
190. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (a) (West Supp. 1999).  Section 102 (a) of the Copyright 
Act requires an original work of authorship containing a minimum of creativity needs to 
be “fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which it can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly of with the aid of a machine, to enjoy copy-
right protection.” Id. 
191. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999). 
192. See James A. Kirkland, Emerging Internet Copyright Issues, 482 PLI/PAT 531, 
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tangible means of expression and that a computer program im-
printed in a ROM is fixed in a tangible medium.194 
B. Infringement of Author’s Exclusive Rights 
The owner of the copyright of the work stored on the Internet 
server’s hard disk may invoke his exclusive rights granted by the 
Copyright Act when his work is being framed. Author’s exclusive 
rights might be infringed either directly by the content provider, 
the framer, and/or the end user,  or indirectly by the Internet ser-
vice provider who has contributed to an alleged copyright in-
fringement. Author’s exclusive rights are expressed in section 
106.195  An author has the exclusive right to do and to authorize: 
the reproduction of the copyrighted work in copies; the preparation 
of derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; the distribu-
tion of copies of the copyrighted works to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; and the 
display of the copyrighted work publicly.196 
1. Framer’s Direct Infringement 
Direct Infringement is based on the notion that somebody’s 
conduct directly infringes authors exclusive rights.  With respect to 
the hypothetical, the framer being the person setting up the framing 
link in the first place is naturally the focus of the analysis. 
 
542 (1997). 
193. Read Only Memory. 
194. See Apple Computer Inc. v. Formula International, Inc. 562 F. Supp. 775, 779 
(C.D. Cal. 1983), aff’d 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (the court does not problematize the 
lower courts finding in terms of the fixation in a tangible medium); see also Stern Elec-
tronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (not recognizing the copy of a 
work as fixed when putting it in memory devices of a computer). This view is shared by 
the United States-government, see INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (1995) [herein-
after NII White Paper]; and is also consistent with the German Copyright Act, see, e.g., 
German commentator KAI VINCK, URHEBERRECHT § 16 (Wilhem Nordemann et al., 8th 
ed. 1994). 
195. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West Supp. 1999). 
196. See id. 
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a. The Right to Reproduce 
The right to reproduce an original work of authorship is con-
sidered to be the most fundamental right of all the author’s exclu-
sive rights provided in section 106.197  Since section 106 (1) refers 
to “reproduction of copies,” the section has to be read in conjunc-
tion with section 101.  The latter provides that “[c]opies are mate-
rial objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known 
or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the 
aid of a machine or device.”198  The significance of this provision 
in the context of framing is obvious.  The conduct of framing must 
constitute a material object in which the framed work is fixed and 
from which it can be perceived, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine.  Since the framed Web site will finally appear on a com-
puter screen it seems to be, at a first glance, an easy task to qualify 
framing as a violation of author’s reproduction right.  But this turns 
out to be different when taking a closer look. 
It has already been stated that digitized works stored in a web-
server’s hard disk fulfill the fixation requirement and generally 
constitutes a copy in a tangible medium.199  However, the conduct 
of framing in itself may not create a copy at all.  It is rather argu-
able that the framer merely creates a link between his Web site to 
the Web site that is going to be framed in purely technical fashion.  
However, linking does not create the fixation of the framed Web 
site on the server’s hard disks and, therefore it does not create a 
copy.  One might argue that a copy of the framed Web site occurs 
when an end user calls on the framing link.  But this copy at most 
comes into existence in a place related to the user, most likely in 
his computer, and not in a place which is related to the framer.200 
However, the technical prerequisite of “framing” is “linking”, 
namely to establish a link from the framer’s Web site to the framed 
 
197. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 
DAYTON L. REV. 547, 550, (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Overlapping Copyrights]. 
198. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999). 
199. See Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 124, § 2.03 [D]. 
200. See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
1993) (ruling that loading software into the RAM of a computer creates a copy). 
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one.  When “linking” would constitute copyright infringement, the 
framer could be directly held responsible.201 But even when ana-
lyzing the technical aspects of linking no creation of a copy can be 
found.  The hypertext link employed by the framer contains only 
the URL address of the linked Web site technically implemented in 
the Web site’s HTML code.  The URL address merely serves as a 
locator indicating where on the Internet the desired information is 
available. As such the URL address does not contain a copyright-
able expression.202  Considering the functional aspect of the URL 
address, it appears likely to be a system or method of operation 
which, when activated, causes the browser software to jump from 
one Web site to another.  Nevertheless, a fact or a method of op-
eration is not copyrightable.203  Moreover, it is widely assumed 
that by uploading a Web site the content provider grants an implied 
license to link.204  Consequently, the hypertext link itself never 
constitutes a copy or otherwise processes any of the data from the 
linked Web site and the author’s exclusive right to reproduce is not 
implicated.205 Consequently, the framer does not infringe the au-
thor’s reproduction right by the mere act of” linking” the latter’s 
Web page to his framing Web site. 
 
201. Caching appears to be another questionable activity under copyright scrutiny.  
However, it is not an issue in the context of framing.  Caching means to make a copy of 
digitized information somewhere between the original medium on which it is stored (hard 
drive, server, or disk) and the end user.  Caching generally provides faster access to Web 
sites by taking it away from a server which might be frequently visited thereby causing 
delay for the end user, see Jerry S. Birenz, Caching World Wide Web Sites, 480 PLI/PAT 
275, 277 (1997). 
202. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 18, at 3. 
203. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (b) (West Supp. 1999).  Section 102 provides that “[i]n 
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regard-
less of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.” Id. 
204. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 18, at 3; see also Mark B. Harrison, Link 
Law on the Internet: A Panel Discussion, 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 197, 227. 
205. See Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: 
Why Copyright Law could be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 
45 (1997); see also Matt Jackson, Linking Copyright to Homepages, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 
731, 742 (1997); O’Rourke, supra note 19, at  658-63) (addressing pure linking merely 
on an implied license theory without further inquiry as to whether linking has an effect on 
author’s reproduction right in the first place). 
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b. The Right to Adapt 
Section 106 (2) grants to the copyright owner the exclusive 
right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work.”206  The definition in section 101 provides that a derivative 
work is a work “based upon one or more preexisting works . . .  in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”207  Courts 
are split with regard to the question whether an adaptation needs to 
contain new copyrightable expression to qualify as a derivative 
work.208  In the case of framing, however, it is not necessary to 
choose sides since the outcome of the analysis is not determined by 
the question whether the framed Web site does add originality or 
not. 
The purpose of the adaptation right is to put the copyright 
owner in the position to control more than simply verbatim forms 
of copying.209 Framing does produce more than simply a verbatim 
copy of the framed work.  It incorporates the framed work, embod-
ied in the Web site, into the framer’s Web site and makes both 
Web sites appear as one entity, using the underlying work as it has 
been framed.  Furthermore, a derivative work does not need to be 
fixed to cause a copyright infringement.210  That a derivative work 
does not need to be fixed might lead to the conclusion that the link 
 
206. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (2) (West Supp. 1999). 
207. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999). 
208. The Ninth Circuit in Mirage Editions Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 
1341, 1343 (1988) held that the act of mounting copyrighted photographs on tiles in-
fringes the author’s adaptation right even though there was no new copyrightable expres-
sion added. To the contrary, the Seventh Circuit decided in Anni Lee v. Albuquerque 
A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (1997), the very same facts differently holding that mount-
ing photographs on tiles does not create a derivative work.  The Seventh Circuit’s opinion 
indicates that new originality is indeed required, see also Lemley, Overlapping Copy-
rights, supra note 197, at 563. 
209. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.2 (1995).  An-
other definition has been provided by Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative 
Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOCIETY 209, 217 (1983).  The commentator states 
that derivative works are directed at a different market than the original work. See id.  It 
seems to be reasonable to claim that the Internet is a new and therefore a different market 
for the distribution of copyrighted works.  Consequently, just posting a work on the 
Internet would already be creating a derivative work instead of a copy. See Lemley, 
Overlapping Copyrights, supra note 197, at 563. 
210. To become a copyrighted work, however, a derivative work needs fixation. See 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 124, § 8.09. 
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itself, the URL address, represents the derivative work. 
The allegedly infringing frame is apparently not fixed as long 
as it is not activated and has no immediate impact on author’s ex-
clusive right. However, the framing link represents a dormant, po-
tential copyright infringement that becomes real once the link is 
activated.  This situation of a dormant copyright infringement is 
analogous to the situation the plaintiff was in Midway.211  In Mid-
way the plaintiff manufactured video game machines with data for 
the game stored on printed circuit boards.  The defendant sold 
printed circuit boards for video games that sped up the plaintiff’s 
video game when properly inserted in replacement of one of the 
plaintiff’s circuit boards.  The court ruled that the circuit board 
sold by the defendant was a derivative work.212  Analyzing the 
courts ruling concerning the defendant’s speed up version it has to 
be pointed out that it did not work by itself but rather in conjunc-
tion with the plaintiff’s video machine. Obviously, the derivative 
work was not fixed within the device the defendant sold.  It was 
merely dormant and became active only when it was inserted in the 
plaintiff’s video machine.  The situation with regard to the framing 
link is similar.  Once it is uploaded it merely needs to be activated 
to cause a copyright infringement assuming that activating the link 
creates a copy of the framed Web site surrounded and therefore 
adapted by the framing Web site somewhere in cyberspace.213  As 
a consequence, the framing link constitutes a dormant adaptation 
analogous to the adaptation the defendant’s device caused in Mid-
way. 
However, considering the legislative history, a work being just 
dormantly of infringing quality does not qualify as an adaptation.  
Legislators were intending that “the infringing work must incorpo-
rate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form.”214  Courts 
followed this incorporation requirement.  In the Lewis Galoob 
 
211. Midway MFG. Co. v. Artic International, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983). 
212. See id. at 1013. 
213. Most likely in the end user’s RAM, for a detailed discussion whether down-
loading a work in the end user’s RAM leads to copyright infringement. See infra Part 
III.B.2.a. 
214. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5675. 
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Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,215 the defendant, Galoob, 
manufactured an add-on device to alter features of one of plaintiff 
Nintendo’s copyrighted video games.216  The add-on device was to 
be inserted between a game cartridge and the Nintendo Entertain-
ment System and did not alter the data that were stored in the game 
cartridge.  The defendant argued that the alterations only occurred 
in the computer processor and therefore necessarily had to remain 
unfixed.  The court concluded that a derivative work must be fixed 
to be copyright protected, but a derivative work does not have to 
be fixed to infringe the copyright of the underlying work.217  On 
this basis, the court held that Galoob’s device could only work in 
conjunction with Nintendo’s video game and therefore did not 
supplant, duplicate, or recast Nintendo’s work.218  Another court’s 
holding in the Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.219 is similar.  
There the plaintiff Vault developed software to protect other soft-
ware from becoming copied.  Quaid, the defendant, developed a 
program disabling Vault’s protection software by loading a com-
puter program into the computer’s memory.  Quaid’s program also 
shared a thirty-character sequence with Vault’s sequence.  The 
court held that the infringing work must incorporate a portion of 
the copyrighted work in some form.220  It particularly saw the 
thirty-character sequence as an incorporation of the copyrighted 
work.221 
Applying the applicable case law it has to be concluded that the 
mere conduct of framing—creating a link by connecting two URL 
addresses to each other—does not incorporate the framed Web site 
into the framing one.  Furthermore, the dormant copyright in-
fringement, which is represented by the framing link, constitutes 
no impact on the author’s exclusive rights.  The framer’s conduct 
 
215. 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 985 (1993) 
216. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967. 
217. See id. at 968. 
218. See id. at 969. 
219. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). 
220. See id. at 267; see also Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied 470 U.S. 1052 (1984). 
221. See Vault, 847 F.2d at 267.  The court, however, dismissed Vaults claim on the 
basis of lacking substantial similarity holding that the copying of 30 characters was not 
sufficient to prove that the copying was substantially similar. See id. at 268. 
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can be better described as a conduct which grants the ability to 
download the framed Web page,222 but as such framing in sense of 
technically providing the link does not yet incorporate the framed 
Web site into the framing one.  For that reason, the conduct of 
framing does not infringe the author’s exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works. 
c. The Right to Distribute 
Pursuant to section 106 (3), the copyright owner has the exclu-
sive right “to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending.”223  Thus, the statute grants the copyright owner the ex-
clusive right publicly to sell, give away, rent, or lend any material 
embodiment of his work.224  However, the mere link between two 
URL addresses connecting the framed and the framing Web sites 
does not create the necessary material embodiment of the framed 
Web site containing the protected work.225  The lack of material 
embodiment of the work in the connecting URL addresses leaves 
no room for the presumption that framing infringes author’s exclu-
sive distribution right because distribution actually does not take 
place at all. 
d. The Right to Perform and Display Publicly 
Section 106 (4) grants an author the exclusive right to perform 
a copyrighted work publicly.226  Section 106 (5) confers the exclu-
sive right to publicly display a copyrighted work.227  In both cases 
the copyrighted work must be either a literary, musical, dramatic, 
or choreographic work, or a pantomime, a motion picture, or an-
other audiovisual work.228  To “display” a work is “to show a copy 
of it, either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, 
 
222. See O’Rourke, supra note 19, at 668 (suggesting this approach as a possible 
way of analyzing the problem). 
223. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (3) (West Supp. 1999). 
224. See National Car Rental Sys. Inc. v. Computer Association International, Inc., 
991 F.2d 426, 430 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861 (1993). 
225. See supra note 224 for the embodiment requirement. 
226. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (4) (West Supp. 1999) 
227. See id. 
228. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (4), (5) (West Supp. 1999). 
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or any other device or process or, in a case of a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequen-
tially.”229  To “perform” a work is “to recite, render, play, dance, 
or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process or, in 
the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its 
images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it 
audible.”230 
In terms of a motion picture the language of both definitions 
clearly indicates that the “performance” of a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work requires “show[ing] its images in any se-
quence” and that the display of a motion picture or other audiovis-
ual work requires only the showing of “individual images nonse-
quentially”.231  Regarding motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works, “display” is limited to individual pictures of an audiovisual 
work (stills) whereas “performance” covers the audiovisual work 
as a whole or any sequence of it.232  In terms of nonaudiovisual 
works like literary, musical, and dramatic works the exclusive dis-
play right will be infringed when a manuscript or printed version 
of the work is being transmitted.233  The impact on framing on the 
exclusive display and performance rights is the same, so that the 
following analysis applies to both the exclusive right to display and 
the exclusive right to perform. 
As it has already been pointed out, the display of a copyrighted 
work as well as its performance needs to be done “in public” to 
qualify as infringing conduct.  Section 101 provides the definition 
of “to perform or display a work publicly.”234  One might argue 
 
229. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999) (defining “display”). 
230. See id. (defining “perform”). 
231. Id. 
232. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 124, § 8.20 [A.] 
233. See id. 
234. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999). “To perform or display publicly” is: 
(1) to perform or display [the work] at a place open to the public or at any place 
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family 
and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise commu-
nicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or 
to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the 
public are capable of receiving the performance or display it in the same place 
or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. 
Id. 
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that the Internet is not a place according to the meaning of the 
statutory language since the Internet is not a place open to the pub-
lic where people are gathered.  However, case law indicates that 
audio transmission to hotel rooms for the benefit of the guests 
qualify as transmission to the public235 as well as video transmis-
sions to four people inside a closed room.236  Therefore, the trans-
mission of a work via the Internet clearly encompasses the trans-
mission to the public pursuant to section 101.237 
 
235. See Buck v. Jewell LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931). 
236. See Columbia Pictures v. Redd Horne Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 1991). 
237. See Lemley, Overlapping Copyrights, supra note 197, at 561; Matt Jackson, 
Linking Copyright to Homepages, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 731, 751 (1997).  The German 
copyright act is being interpreted differently with regard to the exclusive right to broad-
cast set forth in section 20 of the German Copyright Act (UrhG).  Section 20 UrhG grants 
the right “to make a work accessible to the public.”  According to the traditional interpre-
tation of “making a work accessible to the public” shared by the vast majority of German 
legal scholars and the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) “making accessible to the public” 
requires that people have to simultaneously receive a broadcast at a given time without 
being able to choose at what time they want to receive the broadcast, see Ulrich Loewen-
heim, Urheberrechtliche Probleme bei Multimedianwendungen, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT (GRUR) 830, 835 (1996); Federal Supreme Court, 
BGH LM § 20 UrhG - Verteileranlagen.  The traditional concept of one broadcast, which 
can be received just at the time when the broadcast actually takes place, is challenged in 
the context of the Internet.  In the Internet, the consumer decides at what time she is go-
ing to receive the broadcasted work and perhaps when to look at it again.  To create a 
transmission right that goes beyond the simple broadcast right, legal scholars suggest ei-
ther to interpret the language of the statute extensively thereby acknowledging a “succes-
sive public,” which basically means to get rid of the simultaneous requirement thereby 
sticking to the language of the statute, see Ferdinand Melichar, Virtuelle Bibliotheken und 
Urheberecht, COMPUTER UND RECHT (CR) 756, 758 (1995).  Or to apply section 15 (2) 
UrhG analogously which would provide that an author has the “exclusive right to com-
municate his work to the public in non-material form.” MANFRED REHBINDER, 
URHEBERRECHT § 25 IV. 2 (9th ed. 1996). 
 The new European Commission’s proposal for a European Parliament and council 
directive will provide a solution to the broadcast problem as briefly outlined before. See 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Harmonization of Cer-
tain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, COM (97) 628 
Final.  Article 3 of the proposal provides that: 
Member states shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorize or 
prohibit any communication to the public of originals and copies of their 
works, by wire or wireless means, including making available to the public 
their works in such a way that members of the public may access them from a 
place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
Id. Art. 3.  The commission’s comment on this proposal points out that it has been drafted 
particularly to fit within modern “on-demand transmissions.” See id art. 2, cmt. 2, at 20. 
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However, following the language of the definition of ‘digital 
transmission’ in section 101 linking a Web site by creating a con-
nection between two URL addresses does not constitute a trans-
mission.  Section 101 defines a “digital transmission” as a trans-
mission . . . in a digital or other non-analog format.  Assuming that 
the definition of a digital transmission applies not only with regard 
to section 106 (6), it nevertheless indicates that a (digital) trans-
mission is characterized by a transfer of some information. 238  Es-
tablishing the framing link as a conduct lacks such a transfer.  It 
merely provides the technical link between two Web sites without 
actively transferring or communicating information as long as the 
link is not activated. 
e. Intermediate Result 
As an intermediate result it has to be stated that the conduct of 
framing does not infringe any of the author’s exclusive rights set 
forth in section 106.  Neither does the conduct of framing lead to 
the creation of a copy or to a derivative work, nor to a display, per-
formance, or distribution of a copyright protected work.  Conse-
quently, a person, who is engaged in framing a third party’s Web 
site, can not be held directly liable for his conduct under copyright 
law. 
2. End Users Direct Infringement 
The end user of a framed Web site is the person who actually 
calls on the site and views it on his computer screen.  In the con-
text of the Internet it is worth discussing whether the end user by 
virtue of using the Internet interferes with the author’s exclusive 
rights. 
 
238. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (6) (West Supp. 1999).  Section 106 explicitly granting 
copyright owners of sound recordings the right to control public performance “by means 
of a digital audio transmission.” Id. 
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a. Author’s Reproduction Rights 
The reason that the end user’s conduct—calling upon a particu-
lar Web site—triggers the question whether this conduct interferes 
with the author’s exclusive reproduction right is based on com-
puter technology.  The use of any modern computer application 
necessarily involves the creation of a copy in the computers 
RAM.239  In the context of the Internet the browser software 
“loads” the Web page from the server’s host computer into its 
RAM.  Once the information is uploaded it becomes available for 
the computer’s processor and is finally visible on the user’s screen.  
The significance of a RAM is its lack of capability to store infor-
mation permanently.  Once the computer is turned off the informa-
tion disappears from the RAM and remains unrecoverable.  The in-
formation is likewise lost when new information is loaded into the 
RAM going along with the user’s particular application requiring 
the RAM space formerly occupied.  The RAM, therefore and in 
contrast to a hard disk or a ROM, is a temporary storage device. 
(1) Copy in User’s RAM 
It has already been pointed out that section 106 (1) provides the 
right to reproduce an original work of authorship, speaks of “re-
production of copies,” and is to be read in conjunction with section 
101, which defines the term “copy”.240  The definition provides 
that “[c]opies are material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by 
any method now known or later developed, and from which the 
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”241  The 
definition of “copy” indicates the requirement of “fixation,” which 
is defined also in section 101.  Section 101 provides in that respect 
that “a work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy . . . by or under the authority of the author, 
is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a 
 
239. Random Access Memory. 
240. See supra notes 189 and accompanying text. 
241. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999). 
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transitory duration.”242  Unlike a hard disk, which allows perma-
nent and stable storage of information, the RAM is arguably not as 
permanent and stable to allow the information to be perceived for a 
period of more than transitory duration.  Therefore, as it has al-
ready been pointed out, the Computer’s RAM is a temporary stor-
ing device. 
(2) MAI Systems Corp.  v. Peak Computer, Inc. 
The Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems v. Peak Computer, Inc.243 
was the first court to address the question whether the storage of 
information in the RAM is sufficiently permanent and stable to 
permit it to be perceived for a period of more than transitory dura-
tion.244  The plaintiff MAI, manufactured computers and designed 
software to run those computers, which it licensed to its customers.  
The software license allowed MAI customers to use the software 
for their own purposes including the loading of the software into 
the computer’s RAM.  The license prohibits the use or copying of 
MAI software by third parties and the software includes operating 
system software.  The defendant Peak, maintained and repaired 
computer systems for its clients.  The process of maintaining and 
repairing necessarily involves turning on the computer, conse-
quently running MAI’s operating software by storing it into the 
computer’s RAM, thereby checking whether computer and soft-
ware are functional.  Running the operating software also allowed 
Peak’s technician to view the systems error log that enables him to 
diagnose a problem.  MAI claimed that Peak, by virtue of loading 
the software into the computers RAM, created a copy that alleg-
edly infringed MAI’s exclusive reproduction right.245  Peak argued 
that “this loading of copyrighted software does not constitute a 
copyright violation because the copy created in RAM was not 
fixed.”246  The court, without really discussing the issue and with-
out weighing different positions, basically “find[s] that the copy 
created in the RAM can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
 
242. Id. 
243. 991 F. 2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
244. See id. at 513. 
245. See id. at 513, 517-518. 
246. Id. at 518. 
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communicated,’ [and] hold[s] that the loading of software into 
RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act.”247 
This decision has sparked fundamental criticism among legal 
commentators.  They pointed out the legislative history to the 
Copyright Act which indicates that “[t]he definition of ‘fixation’ 
would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient re-
productions such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown 
electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube, or captured 
momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.”248  The language 
easily supports the finding that Congress did not consider RAM 
copies to be fixed.249  In connection with the language in the legis-
lative history, a further argument was made dealing with the fact 
that Congress enacted section 117 (1) and (2), which exempts from 
liability the copying of a computer program “created as an essen-
tial step in the utilization of the computer program . . . for archival 
purposes.”250  Apparently, Congress did not intend every digital 
copy to be an infringement of author’s reproduction right.251  Apart 
from that, the court in MAI became criticized for not discussing 
the “transitory duration” prong of the fixation test252 and not ana-
lyzing preexisting cases that have suggested that RAM copies are 
not fixed.  For example, in Apple Computer v. Formula Interna-
tional253 the court stated that “RAM can be simply defined as a 
computer component in which data and computer programs can be 
temporarily recorded.”254  This utilizing programs in a computer 
“would be only a temporary fixation.  It is a property of RAM that 
when the computer is turned off, the copy of the programs re-
 
247. Id. at 519. 
248. H.R REP. NO. 94-1476, 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666. 
249. See Lemley, Overlapping Copyrights, supra note 197, at 551; Karen S. Frank, 
Potential Liability on the Internet, 437 PLI/PAT 417, 427 (1996). 
250. 17 U.S.C.A. § 117(1)(2) (West Supp. 1999). 
251. See Frank, supra note 149, at 427; see also Katrin Levine, MAI v. Peak: 
Should Loading Operating System Software into RAM Constitute Copyright Infringe-
ment?, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 649, 669-77, (1994) (pointing out that loading the 
software by a maintenance provider into the RAM is an ‘essential step’ pursuant section 
117 (1)). 
252. See Lemley, Overlapping Copyrights, supra note 197, at 551. 
253. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. 
Cal. 1984). 
254. Id. at 622. 
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corded in RAM is lost.”255  However, there are a number of rulings 
which are consistent with the court’s approach in MAI256 as well as 
there is scholarly authority and the United States government sug-
gesting that RAM copies are fixed.257 
Transferring the ruling in MAI into the context of the Internet 
one might argue that browsing the Internet necessarily involves the 
making of copies in the RAM thereby creating a copy in the RAM 
that in turn violates the copyright law.  The argument was made 
that the MAI ruling precludes people’s right to read or grants the 
copyright owner an unknown exclusive reading right.258 This ar-
gument seems to assume that the simple act of reading information 
in the real world is actually free.  But this is not the case.  In the 
‘real world’ consumers have to pay for any kind of information re-
trieval, regardless of whether it is for books, newspaper, magazines 
and so forth.  Access to those sources always was and still is con-
nected with a detriment.  Even borrowing books from libraries is 
impossible when the user does not pay either directly by submit-
ting a fee for every single use or indirectly by paying a member-
ship fee, tuition, or by paying taxes, so that libraries actually have 
 
255. Id. at 622. 
256. See Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 
1995); In re Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 
(D.Kan. 1995); ISC-Bunker Ramo, Inc. v. Altech, 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 
1990); Advanced Computer Services v. MAI SYS., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va 
1994) (pointing out that a copy only comes into existence when it lasts several minutes in 
the RAM). 
257. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 124, § 8.08 [A][1]; see also NII White 
Paper, supra note 194, at 64-66.  Moreover, the WIPO, represented by its Assistant Di-
rector General, Mihaly Ficsor, also seems to maintain that it has been WIPO’s position 
since 1982, that storage of works in digital systems in an electronic medium, regardless 
whether of permanent or temporary nature was considered a reproduction pursuant to Ar-
ticle 9 of the Berne Convention. See Berne Convention, supra note 119, art. 9. (“Authors 
of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right 
of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form”); see also Seth 
Greenstein, News from WIPO: The Final Day—Two Treaties for WIPO, and One More 
for the Road, (visited July 26, 1998) <http://www.hrrc.org/wr_12-20.html> (the unoffi-
cial report); Fraser, supra note 2, at 778 (stating “[i]n fact, under Mr. Ficsor’s interpreta-
tion of the Berne Convention, browsing may already be forbidden”). 
258. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 29, 40 (1994); see also Barbara Cohen, A Proposed Regime for Copyright Protection 
on the Internet, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 401, 412 (1996); see also Fraser, supra note 2, at 
780. 
BURMEISTER.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:37 PM 
690 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 9:625 
to acquire the books on the market in exchange for money.  One 
might say that I could get a book from my friend and read it for 
free without any copyright law interference.  But even in this case 
the same reasoning applies: it is at least the friend who had to pay 
for the book in the first place thereby securing the author’s de-
served remuneration.259  Obtaining a copy from the Internet does 
not involve any monetary transfer at all and potentially deprives 
the copyright owner of the revenue.  Comparing the act of brows-
ing the Internet with the conduct of free browsing a magazine or a 
book to facilitate the decision whether the book or the magazine is 
to be bought also misses the point.  The hard copy might be subject 
to browsing but it cannot be taken away without paying.  This is 
different with a virtual copy from the Internet.  Once a copy is 
downloaded it can be easily stored on the hard disk and then dis-
tributed in an unlimited number either as a virtual copy or printed 
out as a hard copy in exactly the same quality as the original copy.  
Therefore, the free reading argument has to be rejected in favor of 
the court’s ruling in MAI and its subsequent court decisions.260 
 
259. See Fred H. Cate, Law in Cyberspace, 39 HOW. L.J. 565, 577 (1996), who does 
not consider this argument when he points out that newspapers can be read without copy-
ing it.  Neither does Steven Fraser. See Fraser, supra note 2, at 811. Fraser assumes that 
analog copies of copyrighted works were always free. In fact they never were. The first 
copy received from the publisher was always paid for. See id. There is no apparent justi-
fication for a change of this mechanism with regard to copyrightable works published on 
the Internet as Steven Fraser seems to suggest. See id. 
260. See David Nimmer, Brains and other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, SC47 
ALI-ABA 29, 41-42 (1996).  David Nimmer points out that copyright owners were al-
ways able to restrict access to their work permitting, for example, Disney to charge for 
multiple admittance for one movie every time one reenters the movie theater. See id.  “In 
this instance, the right to control reading . . .  is not a revolutionary addition to the copy-
right owner’s exclusive right.” Id. at 47.  Remarkable is the approach expressed by Rich-
ard Stallman. See Richard Stallman, Address at the Eight Annual Computer, Freedom, 
and Privacy Conference (Feb. 18, 1998).  Richard Stallman not only defends a reading 
right in context of the Internet, he radically questioned the legitimacy of copyright in 
general, since no such things as moral rights or natural rights exist. See id.  He also sug-
gested a copyright duration of two years for all kinds of works. See id.  Acknowledging, 
after all, that Richard Stallman’s proposal is intuitively appealing, particularly with re-
gard to software development inhibited by long lasting intellectual property rights, au-
thors nevertheless need an incentive to produce creative work on a high quality level.  His 
proposal to establish a system of voluntary payments to authors seems to be wishful 
thinking.  Apart from the implications imposed by the current international copyright 
treaty regime and without even being an adherent of the natural rights theory, it is needles 
to say that a voluntary payment system and a two year copyright duration cannot be the 
BURMEISTER.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:37 PM 
1999] CHOICE OF LAW, COPYRIGHT, AND THE INTERNET 691 
The outcome of the analysis is that the end user, by loading the 
framing Web site into his RAM, creates a copy of this Web site 
and at the same time, incidentally creates a copy of the framed 
Web site as well.  This leads to the conclusion that the end user in-
fringed the reproduction right attached to the framed Web site. 
(3) A User’s RAM Copy Pursuant to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act 
Following the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,261 Congress 
made clear that a hardware maintenance service does not violate 
the reproduction right when it runs a computer program for the 
sole purpose of repair and maintenance.262  Therefore, MAI v. Peak 
became irrelevant leaving room for a new evaluation of the ques-
tion whether the creation of a copy in a computer’s RAM leads to a 
copyright infringement or not. Considering the narrow exemption 
created by Congress and the generally prevailing fear about the 
violation of copyrights in the digital context, however, it is not un-
likely that courts will consider RAM copies as a violation of the 
copyright holder’s reproduction right remaining in the tradition of 
Mai v. Peak. 
 
basis to give authors a lasting incentive to produce creative work.  People, I suppose, just 
simply would not pay money on a voluntarily basis. 
261. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codi-
fied in scattered section of 17 U.S.C.). 
262. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West Supp. 1999).  Section 117 provides that it is: 
[N]ot an infringement for an owner or lessee of a machine to make or authorize 
the making of a copy of a computer program if such copy is made solely by vir-
tue of the activation of a machine that lawfully contains an authorized copy of 
the computer program, for purposes only of maintenance or repair of that ma-
chine, if  (1) such new copy is used in no other manner and is destroyed imme-
diately after the maintenance or repair is completed; and ‘‘(2) with respect to 
any computer program or part thereof that is not necessary for that machine to 
be activated, such program or part thereof is not accessed or used other than to 
make such new copy  by virtue of the activation of the machine. 
Id.; S. REP. NO. 94-105, at 56 (1998). 
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b. Author’s Remaining Exclusive Rights 
Since in the context of the Internet one usually has to deal with 
overlapping copyrights,263 it might be the case that the end user of 
a framed Web site does not only violate the reproduction right.  
However, concerning the distribution right it is obvious that click-
ing on a framing Web site does not constitute the distribution of 
the framed Web site to the public.  It is just the end user who views 
the site; the public does not take part.  The same reasoning applies 
in connection with the public performance and display right; click-
ing on and viewing the framing Web site is not done publicly. 
However, it might be the case that the end user creates a de-
rivative work since she actually transforms or recasts the framed 
Web site by activating the framing site and letting the framed Web 
site appear on the screen.  This question naturally invokes the dis-
cussion of two issues.  First, whether a derivative work needs to 
add new copyrightable expression to the underlying work and sec-
ond, whether it is sufficient as to the creation of a derivative work 
that the end user does nothing else than clicking on the provided 
link without actively participating in the conduct of recasting 
and/or transforming the underlying work.  In this respect it is 
probably appropriate to say that courts demand that the creator of a 
derivative work participates in the creation of that work at least to 
some extent.  After all, in Mirage264 the creator of the derivative 
work had to mount the photographs on the tiles, thereby showing 
that the creator is somehow substantially involved in creating the 
derivative work.  It is, however, questionable whether this sort of 
active participation in the creation of a derivative work can be 
shown when an end user does nothing more than clicking on a link 
incorporated in the framing Web site.  Perhaps, clicking on the link 
is not sufficient to determine the creation of a derivative work.265 
 
263. See Lemley, Overlapping Copyrights, supra note 197, at 547 (analyzing of 
overlapping copyrights in the context of the Internet). 
264. See Mirage Editions Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343 
(1988). 
265. See Jeffrey Kuester, Link Law on the Internet: A Panel Discussion, 38 IDEA: 
J.L. & TECH. 197, 226 (1998) (suggesting, however,  that clicking on a framing link in 
fact constitutes sufficient participation to create a derivative work: “hyperlinking into a 
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However, this problem does not need to be fully discussed and re-
solved since the standard for infringement is the same for both the 
infringement of the reproduction right and the infringement of the 
adaptation right.  It, therefore, does not matter which of the rights 
is actually infringed.266  Since it has already been analyzed that the 
end user infringes the reproduction right, no further investigation 
with regard to the adaptation right is necessary. 
c. Defenses 
The end user is not helpless after having established that 
downloading a framing Web site infringes the author’s reproduc-
tion right.  As a defense she might appoint the first sale doctrine or 
that the provider of the framed Web site in fact granted an implied 
license to view the content of the Web site by virtue of posting it 
on the Internet.  A third argument could be that the end user’s call-
ing on the framing Web site is a fair use. 
(1) First Sale Doctrine 
The first sale doctrine is codified in section 109 (a) of the 
Copyright Act and allows the owner of a particular copy of a work 
to dispose of possession of that copy in any way, for example by 
selling, leasing, loaning or giving it away without violating the 
copyright owner’s exclusive right of distribution.267 
It could be argued that the end user, by virtue of downloading 
the framed Web site, creates a copy of the framed Web site that 
was lawfully made by its author.  Once the author posts his content 
on the Internet it seems to be reasonable to say she disposed of the 
possession of this copy that was received by the end user.  How-
 
frame in a certain way that changes the intended appearance is sort of like the ceramic tile 
idea. You are taking the original content and putting it in a new arrangement.”) 
266. See Lemley, Overlapping Copyrights, supra note 197, at 550. 
267. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109 (a) (West Supp. 1999).  Section 109 provides in its relevant 
parts that “the owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title, or any other 
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy.” Id.  There are excep-
tions to the first sale doctrine with respect to a particular copy of a computer program or a 
particular phonorecord of a sound recording which can not be rented, leased or lend for 
the purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage. See Lemley, Overlapping Copy-
rights, supra note 197, at 575. 
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ever, it is undisputed that the first sale doctrine is applicable only 
to those situations where the owner disposes of physical possession 
of a particular copy.268  A transmission through the Internet does 
not create a physical embodiment of the work and no physical em-
bodiment of the copy stored on the host server.  The lack of dis-
posal of a physical embodiment certainly leaves no room for the 
assumption that downloading information from the Internet is pro-
tected by the first sale doctrine.  But legal commentators have, 
concerning Internet transmissions, argued that only technically the 
first sale doctrine does not apply.269  According to this view it is a 
fact that copyrights overlap and that transmissions over the Internet 
not only touch on an author’s exclusive distribution right but also 
on his reproduction right.270  Following this point of view, the ar-
gument could be made that the first sale doctrine should apply 
when the transmission is followed by the deletion of the particular 
file which contained the transferred information on the host server 
so that the number of copies do not increase after a digital trans-
mission.271 As a consequence, the usual effect of a reproduction 
would be taken away and author’s right to control the number of 
copies made from his work would not be harmed.272 This argument 
has been rejected by the United States government stating that the 
application of the first sale doctrine would nevertheless weaken the 
author’s exclusive reproduction right and that the reproduction 
 
268. See, eg., Columbia Pictures Industry v. Redd Horne, Inc. 749 F.2d 154, 159 
(3d Cir. 1984) (pointing out that the “first sale doctrine prevents the copyright owner 
from controlling the future transfer of a particular copy once its material ownership has 
been transferred”) (emphasis added). 
269. See Lemley, Overlapping Copyrights, supra note 197, at 575. 
270. See id. 
271. See James V. Mahon, A Commentary on Proposals For Copyright Proctection 
on the National Information Infrastructure an Analysis of Proposed Copyright Changes 
and their Impact on Copyright’s Public Benefits, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
233, 262, n.133 (1996) (suggesting that a work could be deleted once it was downloaded 
from the content providers hosts).  The commentator offers, “by embedding copyright 
information within the computer file, the originating computer could automatically detect 
the transmission of copyrighted material and delete the original copy upon successful 
transmission to the destination computer.” Id. 
272. See id. at 263 (suggesting that there would be no infringement if the convey-
ance of a computer file had been is done by “deleting other copies”) see also Neel Chat-
terjee, Imperishable Intellectual Creations: The Limits of the First sale Doctrine, 5 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383, 387 (1995), (criticizing that the overlap-
ping copyrights limit the freedom of alienation within on-line transmissions). 
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right is simply not within the scope of the first sale doctrine.273 
It is certainly not a common practice that ISP’s delete files 
automatically after they were downloaded for the first time, so, 
with regard to the hypothetical, it can be reasonably assumed that 
the file containing the framed Web page was not deleted after the 
end user’s download.  It goes without saying that the framer has no 
intent and particularly no opportunity to delete the file(s) contain-
ing the framed Web site.  As a consequence, the first sale doctrine 
is not a valid defense for the end user who downloads a framed 
Web site even under the assumption that the first sale doctrine does 
not apply only in a technical sense. 
(2) Implied License 
The question, whether an implied license can be found, refers 
to the law of the transference of exclusive rights.  The Copyright 
Act provides in section 204 (a) in this respect that “[a] transfer of 
ownership . . . is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a 
note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by 
the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized 
agent.”  Section 101 of the Copyright Act furthermore provides the 
definition of the term ‘transfer of copyright ownership’.  Following 
the language of the definition given by section 101 “[a] ‘transfer of 
copyright ownership’ is an . . . exclusive license, or any other con-
veyance . . .  whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, 
but not including a nonexclusive license.” The language clearly in-
dicates that nonexclusive licenses can be granted but are excepted 
from the ‘in writing requirement’ of section 204 (a) of the Copy-
right Act.274  Consequently, nonexclusive licenses can be conveyed 
by oral agreement or can be implied from the conduct of the par-
ties.275 
The case law indicates the grant of an implied license in two 
situations.  In Effects Associates, Inc v. Cohen276 the latter hired 
 
273. See NII White Paper, supra 194, at 94. 
274. See Maclean Assocs., Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc. 952 
F.2d 769, 778 (3d Cir. 1991). 
275. See id. at 779 (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03 [A], who states that 
“[a] nonexclusive license may be granted orally, or may be even implied from conduct.”). 
276. 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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Effects, the plaintiff, to improve a film Cohen made.  The parties 
agreed orally that Effects would be compensated for that work.277  
After finishing the work and handing it over, Cohen only paid half 
of the amount she promised to pay.278  However, Cohen used the 
work by incorporating it into another work to be distributed by a 
third-party.279  The court found that Effects was the copyright 
holder but it did not find copyright infringement.  The court noted 
that “Effects created the work at defendants request and handed it 
over, intending that defendant copy and distributes it.”280  The 
court concluded that Effects “impliedly granted nonexclusive li-
censes to Cohen . . . to incorporate the special effects [and] to dis-
tribute the film.”281 The general rule behind the court’s ruling is 
clear: “when an individual creates a work at a request of another, 
hands it over, and intends for that recipient to copy and distribute 
it, an implied license for the recipient is created.”282  In another 
case the United States Court of Federal Claims held that an implied 
license is created when a person hands over his work to another 
with no pecuniary expectations and with the anticipation that the 
work will be copied and published.283 
With regard to the situation in the Internet and the applicable 
law in mind it cannot be doubted that a person posting his work on 
the Internet grants an implied license to download and to view it 
or, in other words, to browse it.284  Authors know in advance that a 
work, once posted on the Internet, will be available for the millions 
of users connected to the Internet.  Posting a work on the Internet 
even indicates that the author wants his work to be viewed by as 
many people as possible unless she disclaims the implied license in 
terms clearly visible on the homepage or she cancels an implied li-
cense in force by putting up an advanced notice on his Web site.285  
 
277. Id. at 556 
278. Id. 
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 558. 
281. Id. at 559. 
282. Richard S. Vermut, File Caching on the Internet: Technical Infringement or 
Safeguard for Efficient Network Operation?, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 273, 347 (1997). 
283. See Herbert v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 299, 310 (Fed Cl. 1996). 
284. See Nimmer, supra note 260, at 51. 
285. See Jerry S. Birenz, Caching World Wide Web Sites, 480 PLI/PAT 275, 286 
(1997) (stating, with regard to caching, states that a proper copyright notice put up on the 
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It seems to be a precondition for the assumption of an implied li-
cense in the Internet, however, that the Web site is accessed or vis-
ited in the same manner as it has been originally posted on the 
Internet.  The author most likely wants to have her work viewed 
and consumed the way she created it, not in an altered version 
whatsoever or in connection with a different work.  This precondi-
tion is arguably not fulfilled when a Web site containing an origi-
nal work of authorship is framed.  The framed work appears on the 
user’s screen somehow altered and surrounded by a frame showing 
the content of the framing Web site.  Moreover, it seems to be im-
plausible to assume that a copyright holder, without further written 
notice visible on his Web page, intents to permit framing.  Framing 
implies alteration of the copyrighted worked as opposed to pure 
linking where the only purpose is to transfer the end user to the 
linked site which then will be seen without any alterations at all. 
However, if there was a common practice among Web site op-
erators to impliedly license framing one could make the argument 
that any Web site posted on the Internet can be framed.  Insofar it 
is not the Web page operator’s intent which is decisive but rather 
what appears to be common practice with regard to Web page op-
erator’s.  However, cases dealing with framing currently litigated 
in the United States point to the fact that there is no common prac-
tice among Web site operators to grant implied licenses for fram-
ing.286  As a consequence, the idea of an implied license is not ap-
plicable in the context of a framed Web site; there is no basis to 
assume that a copyright owner has impliedly given his consent to 
view his framed Web site.287 
 
homepage would exclude the implied license assumption). 
286. See Washington Post v. Total News, Inc. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Feb. 20, 1997); Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramic Inc. 152 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 
1998) (unpublished table decision) (both cases initiated by plaintiffs whose Web sites 
were framed by the defendants). 
287. See O’Rourke, supra note 19, at 669 (arguing along the same line). 
BURMEISTER.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:37 PM 
698 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 9:625 
(3) Fair Use 
“The doctrine of fair use allows a holder of the privilege to use 
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the consent of 
the copyright owner.”288  The underlying principle of fair use was 
first addressed in 1841 in Folsom v. Marsh289 where the court 
sought to distinguish between an excusable unauthorized use of a 
work and an infringing use.  The court stated “if so much is taken, 
that the value of the original is sensibly deminished, or the labors 
of the original author are substantially to an injurious extend ap-
propriated by another, that is sufficient, in point of law, to consti-
tute a piracy pro tanto.”290  In modern days, the fair use argument 
became an affirmative defense and the last resort against a claim 
for copyright infringement.  As an affirmative defense, the burden 
of proof shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant who wants to 
avoid liability.  It is his obligation to prove the fairness of the use 
rather that the copyright owner needs to prove an accused use not 
being fair. 
The common law doctrine of fair use found its modern expres-
sion in section 107 providing that “the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . . for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, schol-
arship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”291  In de-
termining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is 
a fair use, the language of the statute employs four factors to be 
considered.292  First, “the purpose and character of the use, includ-
ing whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes.”293  Second, the nature of the copyrighted 
work.294  Third, “the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”295  And last, “the 
 
288. See Narall v. Freemann, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989). 
289. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
290. Id. at 348. 
291. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West. Supp. 1999). 
292. See id. 
293. Id. 
294. See id. 
295. Id. 
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effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.”296  The uses listed in the statute do not exclude 
other uses not listed from being recognized as fair use and do not 
create a presumption that a listed use is fair.297  It is clear that 
courts have to evaluate all four factors set forth in section 107 in 
any case to determine whether a particular use is fair or not. 
(a) Purpose and Character of the Use 
The purpose and the character of the use contrasts commercial 
uses with nonprofit educational uses.  The Supreme Court in Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,298 stated with regard to this 
contrast that all commercial uses were to be presumed unfair.299  
The Supreme Court’s subsequent Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enterp. decision does not appoint its former presumption 
but ruled more lenient that a use for commercial purposes usually 
weighs against a finding of fair use.300  The Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc. decision finally overturned the Sony presumption 
and differentiated the actual character of the use by distinguishing 
transformative use of the work from a mere duplication.301  In case 
a user duplicates the work and uses the reproductions commer-
cially the use weighs heavier against a finding of fair use, whereas 
in case a user makes a transformative use and creates a derivative 
work the use weighs more in favor of fair use.302  Concerning the 
mere reproduction feature courts held in a commercial context, for 
example, that off-campus copy shops that manufacture and distrib-
ute photocopies on teachers specification and order are not covered 
by the fair use doctrine.303  Concerning the hypothetical the end 
user certainly does not make a transformative use of the work she 
 
296. Id. 
297. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterp., 471 U.S. 539, 561 
(1985). 
298. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
299. See id. at 451. 
300. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. 
301. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
302. See id. at 584. 
303. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1542 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting an injunction against the defendant’s conduct of ‘Professor 
Publishing’ which was not covered by the fair use defense.) 
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downloads.  She rather creates a reproduction.304  Following 
Campbell, the first factor in the fair use analysis would weigh 
against a finding of fair use if the end user’s use of the reproduc-
tion would be commercial. 
In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,305 the Second 
Circuit suggested, in order to discern the ‘purpose and character of 
the use,’ that the nature and the objectives of the user needs to be 
considered.306  Concerning a user’s objectives, a fair use defense 
will not prevail when the use of the reproduction appears as a form 
of commercial exploitation.307  The court then concludes that “[t]he 
greater the private economic rewards reaped by the secondary user 
(to the exclusion of broader public benefits), the more likely the 
first factor will favor the copyright holder and the less likely the 
use will be considered fair.”308  With regard to the hypothetical 
there is hardly an economic reward for the end user to be found.  
She just gains free information through the framed Web site she 
could have gained for free by accessing the framed Web site di-
rectly anyway.  On the other hand, the end user’s creation of a 
copy is also incidental because technically induced in the com-
puter’s RAM.  The copy will be most likely deleted as soon as the 
end user calls on another Web page or as soon as she turns the 
computer off. 
However, browsing the Internet could have some commercial 
impact, for example, when a company checks out its competitor’s 
Web site to compare and improve its own professional perform-
ance.  But even in this case, the use seems to be more like an “in-
termediate use” which does not weigh against a finding of fair use.  
With regard to intermediate use in Sega the defendant copied com-
puter code to study the idea contained within that program for the 
subsequent development of a competing computer program.309 Us-
ing a copy for such a purpose, the court held, was intermediate use 
 
304. See Lemley, Overlapping Copyrights, supra note 197, at 555. 
305. 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994). 
306. See id. at 922. 
307. See id. 
308. Id. 
309. See Sega Enterprises Ltd., v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514-15 (9th Cir. 
1992) 
BURMEISTER.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:37 PM 
1999] CHOICE OF LAW, COPYRIGHT, AND THE INTERNET 701 
“only and thus any commercial exploitation was indirect or deriva-
tive.”310  As a result, the defendant copied the computer program 
for a “legitimate [and] essentially non-exploitative purpose.”311 
Whereas the copy is not literally an intermediate one, the same rea-
soning may apply to the use with commercial impact in the context 
of framing.  Just analyzing a Web site downloaded into the com-
puter’s RAM to compare professional performance is arguably an 
indirect or derivative commercial exploitation and, therefore, es-
sentially non-exploitative. 
The end users use with regard to the hypothetical is non- com-
mercial. Therefore, the first factor in the fair use analysis weighs in 
favor of a finding of fair use. 
(b) The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
Courts have held that the nature of the copyrighted work 
weighs in the copyright owner’s favor when works of fiction312 and 
unpublished works313 were copied.  In turn they have held in de-
fendant’s favor when factual works314 and published works315 were 
copied.  In the context of framing it might be necessary to distin-
guish between different kinds of works being framed.  Those 
works might be either factual or fiction, weighing either for or 
against fair use. 
Applying the factual/fiction distinction in Total News,316 the 
framed works were news sites that by nature present factual works 
weighing more in favor of a fair use.  Applying the pub-
lished/unpublished distinction in the context of the Internet is more 
difficult. Perhaps, a work put on the Internet is not published fol-
 
310. See id. at 1522. 
311. See id. at 1523. 
312. See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1376 
(2d Cir. 1993). 
313. See New Era Publications Int’l, Aps v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583 
(2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094(1990). 
314. See National Rifle Ass’n v. Handgun Control Fed’n, 15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 
1994). 
315. See New Era Publications Int’l, ApS v. Carol Publ’g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 
(2d Cir. 1990). 
316. See Washington Post v. Total News, 97 Civ. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 20, 
1997). 
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lowing the definition of “publication” in section 101.317  The con-
duct of uploading and downloading a work does not constitutes a 
transfer of ownership as to the work being downloaded into the 
computer’s RAM and the posting does not constitute an offering 
for further distribution of copies neither.  The posting seems more 
likely to be a public display pursuant to the definition of “public 
display” provided in section 101318 which does not in itself consti-
tute “publication.”  The lack of publication clearly weighs against 
the end user calling on a framed Web site. 
However, in the NII paper the United States government sug-
gests that, in the context of the Internet, “it is quite possible that a 
court might evaluate whether a work in digital form should be 
treated differently from a work in a conventional print or other 
analog form for the purpose of evaluating” the nature of the copy-
righted work.”319  This statement indicates that a work posted on 
the Internet perhaps ought to be regarded as published.  The actual 
availability of the work leaves no room to consider a work put on 
the Internet as not being published.  Consequently, a work posted 
on the Internet has to be regarded as published pursuant to the 
definition provided in section 101.  Therefore, the use of a work 
posted on the Internet weighs more in favor of a finding of fair use. 
(c) The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
The third factor in the fair use analysis takes the amount of the 
protected work taken by the infringer into account, measuring the 
quantity as well as the quality.  Concerning the quantity of the por-
tion which was used it seems to be the prevailing view that “[it] 
generally may not constitute a fair use if the entire work is repro-
 
317. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1999) Section 101 provides: Publication is the 
distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of the owner-
ship, or by rental, lease, or lending.  The offering to distribute copies . . . to a group of 
persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, consti-
tutes publication.  A public performance of a work does not of itself constitute publica-
tion. 
Id. 
318. For a more detailed discussion of “public display” See Lemley, Overlapping 
Copyrights, supra note 197, at 561. 
319. See NII White Paper, supra 194, at 78. 
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duced.”320  On the other hand, with respect to the quality of the 
portion being used, even a relatively small portion can cause copy-
right infringement.321  Consequently, the judge is obliged to decide 
on a case to case basis how much of the framed Web site has been 
incorporated into to the framing Web site.  For that reason, it is, in 
the context of the Internet, difficult to state whether the factor 
‘amount and substantiality of the portion used’ generally works 
more in favor of the defendant or against him.  It is, nevertheless, 
most likely that the framing Web page entirely displays the copy-
rightable expression embodied in the framed Web page.322  And, 
furthermore, it seems to be impossible to find a similar justification 
as to the time shifting purpose in Sony323 acknowledged as a valid 
justification for the entire reproduction of a copyright protected 
work.  As a result, the third factor in the fair use analysis weighs 
more against the finding of fair use. 
(d) The Economic Effect of the Use 
The last factor is the ‘economic effect of the use’ which is the 
most important and central factor in the fair use scrutiny.324  This 
part aims at the commercial impact of the use on the copyright 
holder.325  The case law dealing with regard to the fourth fair use 
factor seems to indicate that, once the plaintiff is able to establish 
that she would have had significantly higher revenues from the 
work when it had not been copied, this factor weighs heavily in fa-
vor of the plaintiff.  Thus, a use of a work must not “impair materi-
 
320. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 124, § 13.05 [A]; however, in Sony, 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984), the court ruled that video tap-
ing a TV show completely for time shifting purposes constitutes fair use even though the 
entire work was reproduced. 
321. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. 471 U.S. 539, 569 
(1985). 
322. Technically, it is certainly possible to reduce the framed Web page’s size in 
terms of how it would appear unframed, so that it could fit in the center of the framing 
Web page and surrounded by a frame. 
323. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984). 
324. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 985 (1993). 
325. See Richard S. Vermut, File Caching on the Internet: Technical Infringement 
or Safeguard for efficient Network operation, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 273, 333 (1997). 
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ally the marketability of the copied work”326 and therefore requires 
the analysis whether, “if [the challenged use] should become wide-
spread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copy-
righted work.”327.  With regard to the hypothetical, the conduct of 
framing has two negative effects on the potential market.  One is 
more indirect and the other is more direct. 
i. Indirect Effect 
Internet content providers usually gain revenue from placing 
advertisements from third parties on their Web pages.328  The 
amount of money a content provider can demand for his service is 
determined by the number of visitors his Web site gets.  The num-
ber of visitors can be figured out by counting the number of ‘hits’ a 
Web site receives.329  The higher the number of visitors of a par-
ticular Web site is the more valuable the Web site becomes in 
terms of gaining revenues from advertisement.  Since the framing 
Web site usually also provides third party’s advertisement, the 
conduct of framing adds to the number of content providers com-
peting with each other to do business with third parties willing to 
place advertisements on the Internet.330  It is a basic economic 
principle that increased competition in a given market for a given 
 
326. See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
327. See Sega Enterprises Ltd., v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 
1992), see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 . 
328. See Ellen Poler, Frames and License Agreements, (visited May 10, 1999) 
<http://www.collegehill.com/ilp-news/poler1.html>.  Another way to gain revenue from 
a Web site is to charge a fee for access using the end users credit card number.  Access 
fees are commonly due for playing online games, e.g. Magic Online at 
<http://www.imagiconline.com/start.shtml> (visited July 26, 1998), and online gambling 
(placing the bets), e.g. <https://secure.commerce-sights.com/freeplay> (visited July 26, 
1998), or require at least a membership providing personal information usually including 
credit card numbers, to be seen e.g. at adult Web sites at <http://www.sex.com> (visited 
July 26, 1998).  However, Web sites which charge an access fee or require a membership 
are regularly password protected to restrict access.  This mechanism also prevent the Web 
site from becoming framed by a framing Web site. 
329. It is technically not a problem to count the numbers of hits a Web site receives.  
See the ISP Coastline, offering Web site service including “hit counter” at 
<http://www.coastline. com>. 
330. See Ellen Poler, Frames and License Agreements, (visited July 26, 1998) 
<http://www.collegehill.com/ilp-news/poler1.html> (stating that “[frames] also enable 
the sponsor of the meta site, or content aggregator, to compete against the individual web 
site for advertising revenue”). 
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product is likely to bring prices down because the competing par-
ties tend to undercut their competitor’s prices.  Thus, once a con-
tent provider has lowered his prices to meet the increased competi-
tion, the competing content provider is forced to match the lower 
price to retain its customers and to stay in business.  Unless the 
competing content provider is unable to attract more visitors to his 
Web page, thereby increasing the commercial value of the Web 
site, the consequence of competition for advertisement, induced by 
framing a Web site, is a lower price.  Consequently, in the future a 
framed content provider will gain less revenue for the same num-
ber of web banner advertising she was able to place before.331  
Less revenue for web banner placement clearly indicates a nega-
tive impact on this particular market pointing to the conclusion that 
the fourth factor in the fair use analysis ‘economic effect of the 
use’ weighs against a finding of fair use. 
However, one could argue that current case law applying a fair 
use analysis indicates that the use of a copy and the dissemination 
of a copy to third parties must be direct and that it is the direct use 
which is generally regarded as having a negative impact on the 
copyright holder’s commercial interests.  In Sega Enterprises Ltd., 
v. Accolade, Inc.332 the plaintiff Sega was a copyright owner of a 
computer video system operating with cartridges.333  The defen-
dant Accolade reverse engineered Sega’s video game programs by 
producing a “copy” to be able to decompile the information stored 
in Sega’s game cartridges.  Accolade then loaded the decompiled 
code in its computer and experimented with it to discover Sega’s 
interface specifications.  Accolade recorded the information it 
found and used it in the second stage to create its own games for 
Sega’s computer video system without copying the Sega’s pro-
gram.  The court saw the intermediate copying as such and consid-
ered the fact that the decompilation of Sega’s software affected the 
market for its video game system.  However the court stated that 
the market was merely indirectly affected and that consumers are 
 
331. Web banner ads seem to be usually placed on a short term basis. See id. (stat-
ing that a common web banner continues for 90 days). 
332. 977 F.2d 1510(9th Cir. 1992). 
333. See id. 
BURMEISTER.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:37 PM 
706 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 9:625 
very likely to buy more than one video game.334  To foreclose a 
competitor from this market would be an attempt to monopolize 
the market that can not be a justification for resisting the invoca-
tion of the fair use doctrine.335  In Sony, Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios  the Plaintiff, Universal Studios brought suit against the 
defendant Sony for providing consumers with VCRs granting the 
opportunity to tape record copyright protected television shows.336  
The court held that the shows were recorded just for time shifting 
purposes without further dissemination of the copies to third par-
ties.  Considering these facts copyright holders would suffer no 
economic harm.337 
Sega and Sony seem to apply, when discussing a negative 
commercial impact weighing against fair use, as an underlying 
principle that only direct use of the copy and the making it avail-
able to third parties will be regarded as a negative economic effect 
of the use.  This analysis finds confirmation in Sega Enterprises 
Ltd. v. MAPHIA,338 which indicated that the direct use of a copy 
and its dissemination to third parties is generally regarded as pro-
viding a negative impact on the copyright holders commercial in-
terests.339 
Comparing the facts in Sega, Sony and MAPHIA, it is clear that 
the commercial impact of framing is quite indirect concerning the 
use of the copyrighted work.  But courts also seem to start from the 
general assumption that, as already pointed out, a use is unfair if “it 
adversely affects the potential market for the copyrighted work.”340 
In the context of the Internet it is a given fact that providing space 
for advertisement on a Web page basically is the only way to 
 
334. Id. at 1523 
335. Id. at 1524. 
336. See Sony, Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 438 (1984). 
337. See id. 
338. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
339. See id. The defendant MAPHIA operated a bulletin board system where literal 
copies of Sega’s copyrighted video games where uploaded, downloaded and permanently 
stored. See id. at 688.  The court considered those facts and found that their economic 
impact weighs against the assumption of a fair use. See id. at 688. 
340. See Sega Enterprises Ltd., v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (1993) (cit-
ing Sony, Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)). 
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commercially exploit a Web page.341  Thus, the only potential mar-
ket for the Web page respectively for the copyrighted work is not, 
as it happens to be the case in the real world, to sell copies of it but 
to sell space for third parties’ advertisement.  It does not seem to 
be reasonable to distinguish between direct exploitation through 
selling copies of a work at the one hand and indirect exploitation 
through selling advertisement space “on” virtually existing copies 
at the other when this is literally the only way to retain revenue 
from a copyrighted work.  Therefore, selling space for advertise-
ment on a Web page is exploitation of a potential market in the 
same way as selling copies of a given work in the real world.  This 
potential market for selling advertisement space on a Web page 
would be adversely affected when framing would become wide-
spread. 
The assumption of the foregoing analysis—indirect effects can 
be relevant with regard to negative economic effects of the use—is 
consistent with the Ninth Circuit decision in Princeton Univ. 
Press, v. Michigan Document Serv., Inc.342  The defendant Michi-
gan Document was a close-to-the-campus copyshop which, with-
out the copyright owner’s permission, copied, bound and sold 
coursepacks to students for use in fulfilling reading assignments 
given by professors.343  The court was not inquiring as to the sale 
of books the plaintiff might have lost due to the copyshop’s con-
duct.344  Rather, the court was concerned about the licensing fees 
 
341. Charging a fee for accessing a Web site also generates revenue.  However, 
there are much less Web sites on the Internet which charge accessfees than Web sites 
which do not.  This fact allows to draw the conclusion that it depends on the content’s 
strength and its appealing power to the end user whether an accessfee is charged.  Since 
the majority of Web sites apparently do not have this strength the only possibility to re-
tain revenue is web banner advertising.  See Fraser, supra note 2, at 810 (citing Claudia 
Dreifus, The Cyber-Maxims of Esther Dyson, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, July 7, 1996, 
at 16, 18) (pointing out that oversupply of contend will outpace demand, therefore au-
thors will not receive most of their revenue from access fees but from advertising third 
party’s services)).  Following Chris Charron, an analyst of Forrester Research, quoted by 
Robert Fixmer, Technology, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Monday, July 27, 1998, at C4 (“[t]he 
pie is advertising, and the pie that’s available, we think, will be $ 8 billion in five years, 
with 30 percent of that going to [companies like AOL, Yahoo and Exite]—about 2,4 bil-
lion.”). 
342. 99 F 3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997). 
343. See id. at 1383. 
344. The sale of books was lost anyway since copying conducted by the students 
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which plaintiff generates by usually licensing copyshops to prepare 
course packs for students.345  The court recognized the licensing 
for copyshops as a potential use of, respectively as a potential mar-
ket for, copyrighted works346 and found, after considering the other 
three factors, against fair use.347 The impact of the potential market 
argument is even stronger in the context of framing.  There, selling 
advertisement is, as opposed as to Princeton, the only market in 
which a Web page operator is able to compete.348 
ii. Direct Effect 
The direct economic effect of the use appears also in the con-
text of the sale of space for advertisement.  A Web site, which al-
ready contains ads, might be regularly framed.  One effect of the 
frame might be that those ads are blocked out when visited through 
the framing Web site.349  It seems to be reasonable to assume that 
the framed Web page’s advertisers most likely will reduce pay-
ment or stop paying at all.  This effect without any doubt adversely 
affects the market for the copyrighted work, respectively for the 
framed Web page. 
After analyzing the direct and indirect effect downloading a 
framing Web site has on the market for web banner advertisement, 
the fourth factor in the fair use analysis ‘economic effect of the 
use’ weighs against a finding of fair use.350 
 
would have been covered by the fair use doctrine. See id. at 1386. 
345. See id. at 1387. 
346. See id. at 1388. 
347. See id. at 1388. (Ryan, J., dissenting) (considering the courts argument with 
respect to the loss of license fees as “circular”).  Judge Ryan states that “[i]t is circular to 
argue that a use is unfair, and a fee therefore required, on the basis that a publisher is oth-
erwise deprived of a fee.” Id. at 1407.  See also Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics 
Corp. 758 F. Supp. 1522, (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (acknowledging that copying course packs for 
students without authorization has “unfavorably impacts upon plaintiff’s sales of their 
books and collection of permission fees”). 
348. Notwithstanding the possibility to charge a fee for access or require personal 
information.  See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
349. See Ellen Poler, Frames and License Agreements (visited July 26, 1998) 
<http://www.collegehill.com/ilp-news/poler1.html>. 
350. The outcome of this analysis might change when the framing Web site does 
not replace the framed Web site’s commercials but puts other non commercial related 
information in its frame.  In a case like this the commercial value perhaps even increases. 
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(e) Balancing the Four Factors 
The fair use analysis’ last step requires the balancing of the 
four factors of the fair use analysis. Generally, the purpose and 
character of the use as well as the nature of the copyrighted work 
weigh more in favor a finding of fair use whereas the amount of 
the portion used as well as the economic effect of the use weigh 
against a fair use finding. 
The published nature of the work on the one side and the likely 
display of the framed Web site as a whole on the other seem to be 
equally less strong in their impact on the author’s exclusive rights.  
They are, therefore, nondeterminative with regard to the fair use 
analysis.  The noncommercial character of the use strongly sug-
gests to find the end user’s calling on a framed Web site as fair.  
However, the first factor of the fair use analysis can not outweigh 
the negative effect the use has on the framed Web site’s market be-
cause the fair use analysis’ fourth factor is given the most impor-
tance in the fair use scrutiny.  The end user downloading a framed 
Web site directly impairs the commercial exploitation of the 
framed Web site leaving the content provider no other way to 
make up for the impairment in another potential market.351 
It has to be concluded that the end user calling on a framed 
Web site has no defense against a copyright infringement claim.  
Neither can she rely on an implied license nor can she claim that 
his use is fair use pursuant to section 107. 
C. Liability 
Section 501 (b) entitles the copyright owner to administer 
remedies against the copyright infringement by granting the right 
“to institute an action for any infringement . . . while he or she is 
the owner of it,” thereby establishing a strict liability standard for 
copyright infringement.352 
 
351. See O’Rourke, supra note 19, at 669-70.  Professor O’Rourke comes to a dif-
ferent conclusion suggesting that “[copyright law] . . . seem to support a fair use right to 
employ frames.” Id.  However, Professor O’Rourke reaches her conclusion without con-
sidering the Web page’s advertisement market and both the direct and the indirect nega-
tive economic effects the conduct of framing creates. See id. 
352. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501 (b) (West Supp. 1999). 
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The remedies for infringement essentially consist of injunc-
tions and damages.  Particularly section 502 (a) gives the right for 
injunctive relief “on such terms as it may deem reasonable to pre-
vent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”353 Section 504 gives 
the aggrieved party the choice to collect either actual damages and 
profits resulting from, respectively attributable to, the infringe-
ment.354  The alternative would be statutory damages that range, at 
the courts discretion, between $500 and $20,000.355  In the case the 
copyright owner proofs and the court finds that the infringement 
was committed willfully, the award of statutory damage may in-
crease up to $100,000.  On the other hand, in case where the court 
finds that an infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe 
that his acts constituted copyright infringement, the court has the 
discretionary power to reduce the award of statutory damages to a 
sum not less than $200.356 
1. Direct Infringement 
Section 501 (a) provides that “[a]nyone who violates any of the 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . .  is an infringer of the 
copyright.”357  Needless to say that “anyone” includes the end user, 
who has been found responsible for copyright infringement by vir-
tue of browsing a framed Web site, and that an action could be 
brought for holding her liable. 
However, it is also obvious that the end user is not the person 
who should be held responsible.  First, it is uncertain whether the 
end user does have the money to satisfy an actual or statutory dam-
age award.  And second it appears to be ethically or as a matter of 
policy not right to hold the end user liable.  The end user in case of 
doubt, has no intention to gain a commercial advantage out of his 
or her conduct.  The end user was just visiting a Web site that ac-
 
353. 17 U.S.C.A. § 502 (a) (West Supp. 1999). 
354. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (b) (West Supp. 1999). 
355. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (c)(1) (West Supp. 1999). 
356. 17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (c)(2) (West Supp. 1999).  Section 503 of the Copyright Act 
furthermore grants the right for impounding and disposition of infringing articles; and 
section 505 of the Copyright Act allows, in the court’s discretion, the recovery of  the 
prevailing party’s costs and attorney’s fee. 
357. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501 (a) (West Supp. 1999). 
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tually appeared to be a site he or she initially did not want to call 
on but which he or she could have called on directly without in-
fringing a copyright. Assuming that the end user was granted an 
implied license to visit that Web site.  Furthermore, as a matter of 
practicability, it is surely impossible to track an end user down 
who downloaded a framed Web site.358  It is, therefore, not only a 
matter of practice, but also just and economically advised to refrain 
from suing the end user for copyright infringement.  In this context 
an aggrieved copyright holder might abstain from holding the end 
user liable in case she has a true alternative.  This alternative could 
be the liability of the German framer and his German ISP.359 
2. Indirect Infringement 
While liability for direct infringement is expressly addressed in 
the Copyright Act, the statutory provision does not include liability 
based on the conduct committed by a third party.  However, de-
spite the absence of express language in the statute it is a common 
law principle to impose liability for copyright infringement on 
third parties who were not themselves active in the infringing con-
duct but where somehow participating in the infringing activity.360  
Moreover, one of the copyright statute’s rights granted to a copy-
right owner is the right “to authorize” others to exercise the differ-
ent exclusive rights an author may have.361  Congress’ use of the 
phrase “to authorize” establishes liability for those who simply 
cause or permit others to engage in an infringing act.362  To cause 
or permit someone to engage in an infringing act is indirect in-
 
358. See Nimmer, supra note 260, at 65. 
359. See id. (noting that “without even looking to deep pockets, the only pocket 
amenable to suit is the ISP”). 
360. See Sony, Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (holding 
that “[t]he absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the 
imposition of liability for copyright infringement on certain parties who have not them-
selves engaged in the infringing activity.”). 
361. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West Supp. 1999) (providing that “the owner of copy-
right under this title has the exclusive right to do and to authorize any of the following” 
exclusive rights). 
362. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5674; see also ITSI T.V. Productions, Inc., v. California Authority of Racing Fairs, 785 
F. Supp. 854, 860 (E.D. California 1992), Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 
800 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1986), NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 124, § 12.04 [A]. 
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fringement, which might be either qualified as vicarious conduct or 
contributory conduct, committed, in case of framing, either by con-
tent provider who created the link or her Internet service provider. 
a. Vicarious Infringement 
To establish vicarious infringement two elements are required 
to be independently present.  First, the defendant must have the 
right and the ability to supervise the infringing conduct and second 
the defendant must have an obvious and direct financial interest in 
the exploitation of the copyrighted materials.363 
Since vicarious liability generally applies to the ownership of 
the physical premises where the infringement occurs,364 this form 
of indirect liability is not applicable in the context of framing.  The 
ISP might have such a financial interest since she usually operates 
her service commercially.  However, the ISP clearly has no right to 
supervise the end user preventing her from liability for vicarious 
infringement.  The same reasoning can be applied with respect to 
the framer.  She might have a financial interest in the copyrighted 
material since she is probably eager to draw attention to her Web 
site.  Yet the framer obviously has no opportunity to supervise the 
end user neither.  The end user decides for herself whether she 
calls on the framed Web site or not.  Vicarious liability cannot, 
therefore, be established, neither concerning the ISP nor to the 
framer. 
b. Contributory Infringement 
A person might be held liable for contributory infringement 
when she “with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, 
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of an-
 
363. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 
1963); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Straware Pub. Corp., 900 F. Supp. 438, 440-1 (S.D. Fla. 
1995); Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 834 (8th Cir. 1992); NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 124, § 12.04 [A] [1] 
364. Most likely in “master and servant” relationships like employer-employee, see, 
e.g., Dreamland Ballroom v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); or 
landlord-tenant relationships, see, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co. 316 
F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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other.”365  The applicable case law particularly emphasis the 
knowledge and participation element to held somebody liable as a 
contributory infringer.366  Thus, the defendant objectively needs to 
know or have reason to know that the work in question is copy-
righted and that its use violates the copyright law.367  Moreover, 
the potential contributory infringer must undertake more than just 
contributing to the primary infringement in order to be liable as a 
contributory infringer.368  Her participation must be substantial in 
the sense that it “must bear some direct relationship to the infring-
ing acts.”369 
(1) Internet Service Provider 
The ISP’s contributory liability for third party contend was 
never really questioned since policy reasons strongly suggest to put 
the burden on the ISPs to prevent infringement.370  ISP responsibil-
ity has been extensively discussed.  Legal commentators have sug-
gested the full range of possible solutions as to and to what extend 
ISPs should be held liable for third party content.  The main issue 
is whether an ISP should monitor the content provided by its cus-
tomers.  One end of the scale represents strict liability by express-
ing the view that “[t]he copyright Act dictates that the party who is 
 
365. See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artist Management, Inc., 443 
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
366. See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y 1988) (holding 
that “just as benefit and control are the signposts of vicarious liability, so are knowledge 
and participation the touchstones of contributory infringement”). 
367. See ITSI T.V. Prod., Inc., v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 
854, 861 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Cable/Home Communication v. Network Productions, 902 
F.2d 829, 845-46 (11th Cir. 1990). 
368. See ITSI T.V. Prod., 785 F. Supp. at 861; Gershwin Publishing Corp., 443 F.2d 
1154, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
369. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra 124, § 12.04 [A][2][a].  See Demetriades 690 F. 
Supp. at 294 (holding that, with regard to third party liability, “[s]omething more—
deriving from one’s substantial involvement—is needed”); see also Apple Computer, Inc. 
v. Microsoft Corp. 821 F. Supp 616, 625 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff’d 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 
1994) (citing Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 294, and stating that “[t]he participation of the 
alleged contributory infringer must be ‘substantial’”). 
370. See NII White Paper, supra 194, at 117; see also Fraser, supra note 2, at 797 
(pointing out that ISPs are not common carriers like telephone companies which must 
open their networks to all users without discrimination).  However, access on a non-
discriminatory basis is the condition for an exemption from applying certain laws includ-
ing copyright law. See id. 
BURMEISTER.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:37 PM 
714 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 9:625 
responsible for the storage facility is responsible for the contents 
contained therein. . . .  The sysop must take responsibility for any 
works resident on the BBS that are accessible to the public for 
browsing or downloading.”371  The other end of the scale lobbies 
for no liability at all unless the infringing material is the ISP’s own 
content.372  An intermediate solution stresses that “[l]iability 
should be found if the provider has actual knowledge that a work 
that is being posted or has been transmitted onto, or stored on, its 
system is infringing, and has the ability and authority to stop the 
transmission, and has, after a reasonable amount of time, allowed 
the infringing activity to continue.”373 This approach appears to be 
consistent with the United States government’s approach as to ISP 
liability.374  The government maintains that “[s]ervice providers 
should have an incentive to make their subscribers more aware of 
copyright law and to react promptly and appropriately to notice by 
copyright owner that infringing material is available on their sys-
tems.”375  Courts seem to move in the direction of the intermediate 
position.376  Particularly the court in Netcom excluded strict liabil-
 
371. See Joseph V. Myers III, Speaking Frankly about Copyright Infringement on 
Computer Bulletin Boards: Lessons to be Learned from Frank Music, Netcom, and the 
White Paper, 49 VAND. L. REV. 439, 474 (1996). 
372. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information 
Superhighway: The Case against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 409-10 (1995).  The commentator has strong arguments 
for her position that ISP liability would induce a centralized mechanism of creation and 
dissemination of information, would furthermore impose a high degree of monitoring us-
ers. See id.  As a consequence, cost of monitoring reduce the incentive to provide on-line 
services, and increased cost will be born by users what reduces the number of potential 
users. See id. at 405-7. 
373. See Kevin M. Cox, Online Service Providers and Copyright Law: The Need 
for Change, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS & POL’Y 197, 202 (1995). 
374. See NII White Paper, supra 194, at 124. 
375. Id. 
376. The On-Line Copyright Liability Limitation Act (“OCLLA”) was introduced 
to the House of Representatives also in September 1997 and also precludes ISP from li-
ability provided that the ISP has no knowledge of the copyright infringement. See H.R. 
NO. 105-2180 (1997).  The On-Line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act 
(“OCILLA”) was introduced to the House of Representatives precluding ISP liability for 
intermediate storage “if (A) the transmission was initiated by another person, (B) the 
storage and transmission is carried out through an automatic technological process, with-
out any selection of that material by the provider; and (C) any copy made of the material 
is not retained longer than necessary for the purpose of carrying out that transmission.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-3209 (1998); see also Daniel Cahoy, Comment, New Legislation Re-
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ity as well as non liability at all and asked as to whether the ISP 
had reason to know about infringing material on his servers and as 
to whether the ISP might have substantially participated in the in-
fringing activity.377 
(a) Knowledge 
ISPs usually do not know about the activity of their clients.  To 
determine when constructive knowledge should be imputed, the 
legal standard has to be applied in accordance with the applicable 
holdings of the courts. 
In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme 
Court adopted a relatively lenient standard with regard to manufac-
turers of equipment capable of infringing uses.378  The court ap-
plied the “staple article of commerce” doctrine holding that if 
equipment used for infringing copyrights was “capable of substan-
tial non-infringing uses” then liability for the manufacturer of the 
equipment is not an option.379  However, courts have developed a 
higher standard of care for persons who maintain control over 
equipment that has both infringing uses and substantial non-
infringing uses.  In RCA Records380 a copy service provided access 
 
garding on-Line Service Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement: A Solution in 
Search of a Problem?, 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 335, 353-359 (1998) (providing a more 
detailed analysis of the proposed legislation and concludes that legislation with regard to 
ISP liability is unnecessary and detrimental at this time). The current system limits the 
liability of ISPs reasonably while it also maintains “the incentive to curb truly egregious 
infringement.” Id. at 360. 
377. See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Service, 
Inc. 907 F. Supp 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  But see Playboy Enterprises, Inc., v. Frena 839 
F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).  In Playboy, the defendant operated a computer bulletin 
board for subscribers who uploaded copyright protected photographs. Id. at 1554.  The 
defendant argued that he himself did not copy any of the photographs, and was not aware 
of the copies posted on the BBS.  The court nevertheless found the defendant directly li-
able for infringing the plaintiff’s distribution right by supplying a product containing un-
authorized copies of the copyrighted photographs. Id. at 1559.  In another case with simi-
lar facts the court based its decision both on direct infringement as well as on 
contributory infringement, see Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA 857 F. Supp. 679 
(N.D. Cal. 1994). 
378. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
379. See id. at 442. 
380. RCA Records, Inc. v. All-Fast Systems, Inc. 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
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to a machine capable of making copies of cassette tapes at fast 
speed. The actual copying was performed by the store’s employ-
ees.381  The plaintiff sought an injunction against the defendant’s 
conduct and the court found direct liability but took also the possi-
bility into account that allowing customers to have access to the 
machines to make their own copies could cause liability on the ba-
sis of contributory infringement.382  The court concluded that the 
shop owner was in a better position to control the use of his poten-
tially infringing device than the manufacturer and ordered, conse-
quently, that the copy shop could not allow customers to use the 
fast copying machines if the owner has “reasonable cause to be-
lieve [a customer] intend[ed] to use the machine to copy plaintiff’s 
copyrighted recordings.”383 
It can be assumed that the host server of an ISP is a potentially 
infringing device that can only be controlled by the ISP itself.  Ap-
plying RCA, therefore, the ISP has to stop copyright infringement 
when it has reasonable cause to believe that a particular posting in-
fringes copyright.  But it seems to be difficult to establish, under 
which circumstances an ISP is obliged to exercise its duty.  Con-
sidering the mass of data an ISP has to handle in a given time pe-
riod, it would seem to impose too much of a burden on ISP’s to 
screen out infringing postings before they are made.  Therefore, in 
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication 
Service, Inc.,384 the court allows an ISP to post content without the 
initial inquiry whether the content to be posted is of infringing 
quality or not.385  However, it established a standard of reasonable 
verification an ISP has to administer, allowing an ISP to continue 
the posting of the Web page in question, once it has received no-
tice about an alleged infringement.  The court found in that respect 
that the BBS operator’s lack of knowledge will be found reason-
able where the operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of in-
 
381. See id. at 337 
382. Id. at 339. 
383. Id. However, plaintiffs request for seizure of the copy machine was denied be-
cause plaintiff could not prove that the copy machine was exclusively used to copy its 
copyrighted recordings. See id. at 340. 
384. 907 F. Supp 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
385. See id. at 1373-74 
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fringement.386 
Such lack of ability to verify must either be due to a possible 
fair use defense, the lack of copyright notices on the copies, or the 
copyright holder’s failure to provide the necessary documentation 
to show that there is a likely infringement.387  Under such circum-
stances, there will be no liability for contributory infringement for 
allowing the continued distribution of the works on its system.388 
Since the defendant in Netcom actually did not pay attention to 
the notice being given about an alleged copyright infringement the 
court found that “[t]hese facts are sufficient to raise a question as 
to Netcom’s knowledge once it received a letter from the plain-
tiffs.”389 
The Netcom decision appears to be applicable also in the con-
text of framing with regard to the knowledge requirement.  In this 
context, therefore, an ISP has knowledge once it has received no-
tice about the allegedly infringing activity and when it either ig-
nores the notice without further investigation or, upon investiga-
tion, unreasonably concludes that there is no claim of 
infringement. 
(b) Substantial Participation 
Once the element of knowledge has been established, liability 
will be imposed only if the ISP participates in the infringing activ-
ity by inducing, causing, or materially contributing to the infring-
 
386. See id. at 1374 
387. See id. 
388. See id. 
389. Id. at 1375.  Germany’s standard with regard to ISP liability is somewhat simi-
lar.  Section 5(2) of the Teleservice Act,  adopted in the course of the legislation of the 
Information and Communication Services Act (IuKDG), in force as of August 1, 1997, 
provides explicitly that “[p]roviders shall not be responsible for any third-party content 
which they make available for use unless they have knowledge of such content and are 
technically able and can reasonably be expected to block the use of such content”. Tele-
service Act § 5 (2).  The reasonableness standard employed by the act is defined by up to 
date state of technical art, see Ulrich Sieber, Kontrollmöglichkeiten zur Verhinderung 
rechtswidriger Inhalte in Computernetzen (I), COMPUTER UND RECHT (CR) 581, 588 
(1997).  The IuKDG is available in English translation at 
<http://www.iid.de/rahmen/iukdgebt.html>. 
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ing conduct of the primary infringer.390  Such participation needs 
to have a certain degree, thus it must be substantial.391 
Courts seem to find substantial participation in cases were the 
defendant’s contractual relationship to the primary infringer di-
rectly or actively induces or causes the infringement.  In Netcom 
the defendant was the primary infringer’s Internet service provider 
who had a contractual relationship with another defendant’s bulle-
tin board service (BBS), who in turn made it possible for the pri-
mary infringer to upload the allegedly infringing material for fur-
ther distribution.392  In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia 
Artist Management, Inc.,393 a promoter organizing and directing a 
concert in which musicians performed copyrighted music without 
the copyright owner’s permission substantially participated in the 
infringing activity.394  In Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,395 the 
defendant’s and the primary infringer’s contractual relation was 
based on a space rental agreement and the defendant actively 
sought to provide the environment for the infringing conduct.396  
On the other hand courts seem to deny substantial participation in 
cases were the contractual relationship between the defendant and 
the primary infringer provides to the infringing conduct passively.  
In Demetriades v. Kaufmann,397 the defendant, who, as a real estate 
broker, sold land to individuals who were conducting copyright in-
fringement on the premises sold, did not actively contribute to the 
copyright infringement.398  In Varon v. Santa Fe Reporter, Inc.,399 
were an employee gave an art magazine to her employer who cop-
ied pictures from this magazine and published them in a newspa-
per, the defendant was not liable because she “took no active part” 
in the infringing conduct.400  The court in Fonovisa also distin-
 
390. See supra note 365 and accompanying text. 
391. See supra notes 368-369 and accompanying text. 
392. See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Service, 
Inc., 907 F. Supp 1361, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
393. 443 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1971). 
394. See id. at 1162-63. 
395. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1995) 
396. See id. at 264. 
397. 690 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
398. See id. at 294. 
399. 218 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 716 (D.N.M. 1982). 
400. Id. at 718. 
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guishes expressly between active participation and passive partici-
pation.401 
In the context of framing the ISP certainly has no contractual 
relationship with the primary infringer, the end user, and she does 
not actively cause or induce the copyright infringement conducted 
by the primary infringer.  The ISP merely provides the access to 
the posting without being at all able to control who is accessing the 
server or who is downloading information provided by individuals 
with contractual relationships to the ISP.  The primary infringer on 
the other hand is mainly interested in getting the information re-
gardless of the ISP providing the service.  He, when retaining in-
formation from a Web site, most likely does not even know who 
the content providers ISP is.  As a consequence, the ISP, in the 
context of framing, does not substantially participate in the infring-
ing activity and she should not be held liable. 
(c) The Internet Service Provider’s Liability pursuant 
to the Digital Millennium Act 
Following the Digital Millennium Act Congress has explicitly 
provided a provision dealing with the ISP’s direct liability. Pursu-
ant to section 512(c) of the Copyright Act, an ISP is exempted 
from liability under three conditions.402  First, an ISP must not 
know that she is hosting infringing material. Second, An ISP must 
not have gained a financial benefit attributable to the infringing ac-
tivity.  Finally, after notification, an ISP is obliged to remove or 
disable access to the allegedly infringing material.403  The new law 
 
401. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 259 at 264. 
402. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c) (West Supp. 1999). 
403. See id.  Section 512 provides: 
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or except as provided 
in subsection (i) for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement for the 
storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity is infringing, 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circum-
stances from which infringing activity is apparent, or  (iii) if upon obtaining 
such knowledge or awareness, the service provider acts expeditiously to re-
move or disable access to, the material; (B) does not receive a financial benefit 
directly attributable to the infringing activity, where the service provider has 
the right and ability to control such activity; and  (C) in the instance of a notifi-
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indicates that there will be no difference between it and the law es-
tablished by Netcom. Knowledge as to the infringing activity is a 
condition for ISP liability as is the duty to remove infringing mate-
rial after notification. The element of a financial benefit corre-
sponds to contributory infringement because contributory in-
fringement generally requires a contractual relationship between 
the infringer and the ISP. 
It is, however, likely that section 512(c) is not applicable in the 
context of framing. Section 512(c) explicitly provides that “a ser-
vice provider shall not be liable for monetary relief . . . for in-
fringement for the storage at the direction of a user of material that 
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the 
service provider.”404  This section indicates that an ISP is ex-
empted from liability when she hosts no infringing material at all. 
This is the case with framing. The ISP only hosts the technical link 
which in itself contains no infringing material.  Therefore, it is 
likely that the ISP’s liability for framing conducted by another con-
tend provider remains to be determined by the relevant case law 
which indicates that an ISP can not be held liable for framing con-
ducted by a third party. 
(2) Framer 
The framer’s conduct also requires analysis as to his knowl-
edge and his substantial participation. 
(a) Knowledge 
With regard to the knowledge requirement within the contribu-
tory infringement analysis,405 the framer certainly does not posi-
tively know about a particular end user violating a copyright since 
the framer just provides the link between his and the copyright 
holder’s Web sites.  However, it is clearly the framer’s intention to 
have users calling on his Web site and executing the link that she 
 
cation of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds expedi-
tiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be in-
fringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 
Id. 
404. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c) (West Supp. 1999). 
405. See supra note 376 and accompanying text. 
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has provided.  Moreover, the framer is most likely aware of the 
fact the use of current computer technology inevitably induces a 
copy of the framed Web site in the end user’s RAM.  It is, there-
fore, obvious that the framer has at least reason to infer about the 
end user’s copyright infringement. 
(b) Substantial Participation 
With regard to the substantial participation requirement within 
the contributory infringement analysis,406 it is clearly the case that 
the end user has no contractual relationship with the framer.  The 
lack of a contractual relationship suggests, of course, that the 
framer has no duty to provide the link and that the end user has no 
duty to call on the framer’s Web site.  The lack of mutual duties 
might lead to an inference that the framer does not substantially 
participates in the end user’s infringing activity, however, the 
framer materially contributes to the infringing quality by providing 
the link.  Even though the link as such is not material in the sense 
the applicable case law seems to suggest it should be; particularly, 
that the link does not represent a physical space like a ballroom or 
the ISP server’s hard drive.  Nevertheless the link exist in virtual 
reality and, as it is with physical space, it facilitates and enables the 
generation of the infringing copy of the framed Web site in the end 
user’s RAM.  The link or the provision of the link, consequently, 
should be treated analogous to a material contribution to an in-
fringing activity, leading to the conclusion that the framer substan-
tially participates in the infringing conduct of the end user. 
3. Intermediate Result 
Refraining from holding the end user liable for practical and 
economical reasons, only the framer should be held liable for indi-
rect copyright infringement.  However, vicarious liability cannot 
be established, neither with regard to the ISP nor with regard to the 
framer because both are unable to supervise the end user while 
browsing the Internet.  Contributory liability cannot be established 
with regard to the ISP.  Even though one assumes she was on no-
tice with regard to infringing activity conducted on her server the 
 
406. See supra notes 392-393 and accompanying text. 
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ISP does not substantially participate in the infringing activity.  
The ISP merely provides access to her server and has no active re-
lationship with the end user downloading information stored on the 
ISP’s server.  To the contrary, the framer at least has reason to in-
fer about the end user’s infringing activity and does substantially 
participate in the infringing conduct. By creating the framing link 
she materially provides the means to create a copy in the end user’s 
RAM the infringing activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Recalling the hypothetical, where a German person created a 
link between his Web site and Web site provided by a United 
States citizen, posted it on a German ISP and an end user from the 
United States called on the framing Web site, the German framer 
can be held liable for copyright infringement under the United 
States Copyright Act of 1976. 
United States courts can exercise personal international juris-
diction over both, the framer and the ISP, by virtue of the mini-
mum contacts the defendants established to the United States as a 
whole.  United States law is applicable following the traditional lex 
loci commissi approach that is analogously to be applied due to the 
shortcomings of the traditional territoriality principle.  The framer 
significantly contributes to the copyright infringement conducted 
by the end user, who violated the copyright laws by downloading 
the framed Web page in his computer’s RAM.  The ISP is exempt 
from liability since, even though she might know about the in-
fringement, she did not substantially participate in the end user’s 
infringing conduct. 
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